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A coach’s power over athletes can extend to virtually all aspects of the student-
athlete’s life, in such ways that clear boundaries are hard to delineate. This
near total control is rarely questioned. It is especially emblematic of coach-
athlete relationships in sport cultures that place a premium on winning over
other values, such that the team culture encourages sacrificing the liberty and
autonomy of the individual for the good of the team (with “good” defined as
winning).1
I. INTRODUCTION
Across amateur and collegiate athletics, story after story has come
to light—often, years belatedly—about abuse and exploitation of ath-
letes by people in positions of power. In the collegiate ranks, dis-
turbing reports recently surfaced that, over a two-decade career, a
football team physician at Ohio State University groped and fondled
dozens of players during medical examinations. University authorities
were aware of the misconduct but did nothing to stop it from occur-
ring.2 The Ohio State scandal is especially unsettling given the dura-
tion of the officials’ willful blindness—but it is not isolated. Rutgers
University fired its men’s basketball coach in 2013 after videos were
leaked to journalists showing his temper tantrums during practice
sessions where he kicked players, threw basketballs at them, and
taunted them with slurs.3 The University of Utah took years to re-
move a swimming coach whose players complained of cruel and ma-
nipulative behavior, despite evidence of a violent temper and alcohol
abuse.4 At the University of Nebraska, softball players say an abusive
1. DEBORAH L. BRAKE & MARIAH BURTON NELSON, NCAA, STAYING IN BOUNDS: AN
NCAA MODEL POLICY TO PREVENT INAPPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STU-
DENT-ATHLETES AND ATHLETICS DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL 15 (2012) (footnote
omitted).
2. Victor Mather, Ohio State Finds Team Doctor Sexually Abused 177 Students,
N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/sports/ohio-
state-sexual-abuse.html [https://perma.unl.edu/3TUD-FJSU].
3. Steve Eder & Kate Zernike, Rutgers Leaders Are Faulted on Abusive Coach, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/sports/ncaabasketball/
rutgers-fires-basketball-coach-after-video-surfaces.html [https://perma.unl.edu/




4. Lindsay Whitehurst & Aaron Falk, Report: Former U. Swim Coach Should Have
Been Fired for Alcohol Abuse, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 2, 2013, 3:26 PM), https://
archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=56542931&itype=CMSID [https://perma.unl.
edu/LD9F-M4BC].
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coach made athletes risk their health by playing through painful inju-
ries.5 As one former Nebraska player told the Washington Post: “The
truth is there is no one athletes can report to. Everybody that an ath-
lete could trust or may rightfully trust, they still work for the univer-
sity and answer to the university.”6
The curtain of secrecy that tightly envelops college sports makes it
difficult for athletes to blow the whistle on abusive conditions without
fear of suffering retaliation. The seemingly obvious recourse for a
player who distrusts the internal complaint process—to take the com-
plaint public—is foreclosed at many colleges because athletes are for-
bidden from speaking to the media without approval from the athletic
department. Is this legal? Can a public institution enforce a categori-
cal prohibition on speaking without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment? Despite the widespread perception of university athletic
departments, the answer almost certainly is “no.”
Courts have consistently found that the First Amendment protects
the ability of public employees to speak to the news media about work-
related matters without a supervisor’s approval.7 First Amendment
caselaw is equally clear that public universities cannot restrict or pun-
ish student speech absent extreme circumstances. Athletes are
treated as occupying a nether zone, fitting comfortably neither in the
category of “student” nor “employee.” But regardless of which legal
status applies to student-athletes, the outcome should be the same:
government agencies—including state universities—do not have ple-
nary authority to restrain people from speaking to the press and pub-
lic. Still, prohibitions on unapproved interviews are, unabashedly,
enforced in college athletic programs everywhere. They appear in the
handbooks of major college athletic programs from Arizona State8 to
West Virginia,9 inhibiting athletes from sharing unguarded observa-
tions with the press and public.
5. Ben Strauss, Complaints Against Nebraska Softball Coach Show College Athletes’




7. Frank D. LoMonte, Putting the ‘Public’ Back into Public Employment: A
Roadmap for Challenging Prior Restraints That Prohibit Government Employees
from Speaking to the News Media, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2019).
8. ARIZ. STATE UNIV., STUDENT-ATHLETE 2019–2020 HANDBOOK 46 (2019) (produced
in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOI) request, copy on file with au-
thors) (“Student-athletes should not conduct any interviews without consent from
the media relations office.”).
9. W. VA. UNIV., ATHLETICS COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA & SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES 1
(produced in response to FOI request, copy on file with authors) (“NEVER AGREE
TO AN INTERVIEW UNLESS IT HAS BEEN COORDINATED THROUGH ATHLETICS COMMUNI-
CATIONS OFFICE. This helps to avoid contact with unauthorized people and keeps
you safe and your team safe and compliant with NCAA legislation.”).
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The issue of college athletes’ rights has never been more promi-
nent. California exploded the NCAA’s long-established adherence to
amateurism by enacting a 2019 statute entitling players to capitalize
on their notoriety by accepting endorsement payments and hiring
agents, activities which the NCAA has long treated as disqualifying.10
This move led legislators across the country to propose lookalike
bills.11 Attorneys for college athletes secured a $60 million settlement
from video-gaming giant EA Sports after demonstrating that the man-
ufacturer profited by designing “virtual” players based on the like-
nesses and skills of actual players.12 More than 43,000 former college
players received checks as part of a $208.7 million settlement with the
NCAA and eleven athletic conferences in a lawsuit alleging that the
NCAA unlawfully restrained its member schools from fully compen-
sating athletes for the costs of attending college.13 A pair of parallel
class-action antitrust cases brought on behalf of athletes is challeng-
ing both the NCAA’s caps on compensation and prohibition on earning
outside income through capitalizing on the value of athletes’ like-
nesses.14 The NCAA recently entered into a global $75 million settle-
10. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67456–57 (2020) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); Colin Dwyer, Cali-
fornia Governor Signs Bill Allowing College Athletes to Profit from Endorsements,
NPR (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:13 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/30/765700141/cali
fornia-governor-signs-bill-allowing-college-athletes-to-profit-from-endorsem
[https://perma.unl.edu/Z38R-4ZNJ].
11. See e.g., Charlotte Carroll, Florida Rep Proposes Bill Compensating College Ath-
letes for Names, Likeness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.
com/college/2019/10/01/florida-state-representative-proposed-legislation-pay-stu-
dent-athletes [https://perma.unl.edu/96UZ-ZABV]; Jamie Munks, Illinois Legis-
lator Introduces Bill to Let College Athletes Be Paid, Saying He Wants to Stay
Competitive with California, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/politics/ct-illinois-college-athletes-pay-bill-20190930-yhnkshh2k5aapog
s5iwfdh6eei-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/J3H6-MKAB]; Dan Murphy, N.Y.
Senator Proposes Bill to Pay College Athletes, ESPN (Sept. 18, 2019), https://
www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27644345/ny-senator-proposes-bill-pay-
college-athletes [https://perma.unl.edu/D8DA-FF7Z].
12. Ron Clements, EA Sports Reaches $60M Settlement of O’Bannon Suit with Col-
lege Athletes, SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/
other-sports/news/obannon-case-ea-sports-settlement-60-million-college-athletes-
ncaa-2014/1e7g4auhk91s115zl37499w94c [https://perma.unl.edu/2Y83-2RVR].
13. Steve Berkowitz & Jori Epstein, NCAA’s $208.7 Million in Legal Settlement




14. The first of these cases, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), re-
sulted in a ruling that the NCAA may not prevent member institutions from
awarding athletes compensation covering the full cost of their college attendance.
More recently, a U.S. district court decided in March 2019 that NCAA member
colleges must be free to award “education-related benefits” to athletes above-and-
beyond free tuition, and that NCAA caps on compensation are an illegal restraint
on trade. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d
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ment to resolve part of a wave of 300 class-action lawsuits filed by
former athletes claiming their schools’ inadequate response to concus-
sions exposed them to traumatic brain injury.15 Football players at
Northwestern University sounded alarms throughout college athletic
departments by launching a unionization movement seeking the bene-
fits of “employee” status that are denied to student-athletes.16 In
these ways, athletes and their advocates are organizing to push back
against the long-established regime of rigid institutional control that
critics have likened to a “plantation” system.17
This Article augments the growing body of scholarship about ath-
letes’ rights by focusing on one particular and largely overlooked right:
the right to speak freely to the news media. The Article concludes that
athletes’ right to discuss issues of public importance—including issues
about the safety and integrity of an athletic program—is protected by
the First Amendment at state universities despite the fact that insti-
tutions across the country are routinely infringing upon this right.
The right to speak to the media is foundational to athletes’ ability to
1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2019). For a detailed discussion of both cases and their
historical backdrop, see Daniel Laws, Amateurism and the NCAA: How a Chang-
ing Market Has Turned Caps on Scholarships into an Antitrust Violation, 51 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1224–28 (2017).
15. See Craig Lyons, $75 Million NCAA Settlement to Fund Concussion Screening for
4 Million Former Athletes, LANSING ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://
www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/2019/08/15/ncaa-concussion-settlement
-athlete-medical-testing/2012186001/ [https://perma.unl.edu/CQ4R-RHJ3]; Ralph
D. Russo, Wave of Concussion Lawsuits to Test NCAA’s Liability, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Feb. 7, 2019), https://apnews.com/4a4ed68e4c3a426abc4e34606ae4a399
[https://perma.unl.edu/8FYZ-3FV3]; Jon Solomon, Next Wave of Concussion Law-




16. Joe Nocera & Ben Strauss, Fate of the Union: How Northwestern Football Union
Nearly Came to Be, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.si.com/col-
lege-football/2016/02/24/northwestern-union-case-book-indentured [https://
perma.unl.edu/FR2C-76ZD].
17. One of the NCAA’s founding architects, Walter Byers, acknowledged in his 1995
memoir that “[t]he college player cannot sell his own feet (the coach does that)
nor can he sell his own name (the college will do that). This is the plantation
mentality resurrected and blessed by today’s campus executives.” See Taylor
Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011 (citing WALTER BYERS,
UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 390 (1997) in wide-
ranging critique of economic exploitation of college athletes); see also Keli Goff,
Are College Sports a Modern-Day Plantation?, ROOT (Oct. 16, 2013, 12:59 AM),
https://www.theroot.com/are-college-sports-a-modern-day-plantation-1790898505
[https://perma.unl.edu/GF8S-VLEJ] (citing interview with Taylor Branch and
concluding that “in the current collegiate athletic system, players have virtually
no rights”).
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blow the whistle on wrongdoing and safety hazards within their own
teams which might otherwise go unaddressed.18
In Part II, the Article discusses instances in which universities
have forbidden athletes from having unapproved communication with
journalists, and why the inability to speak freely with the news media
puts the safety and integrity of college athletic programs at height-
ened risk. Additionally, Part II describes the findings of a nationwide
survey which documented how pervasively public universities have re-
stricted athletes’ ability to speak to the media despite the dubious en-
forceability of such blanket “gag” policies. Part III describes how the
judiciary has adapted First Amendment principles to the settings of
the campus and the workplace where free-speech rights at times yield
to competing imperatives of institutional effectiveness and order. Part
IV explains how public employees have consistently prevailed in con-
stitutional challenges to prohibitions on interviewing that are essen-
tially identical to those put in force by college athletic departments
because the policies are overbroad and lack adequate procedural safe-
guards. Part V looks at how the courts have dealt with constitutional
claims by athletes against their institutions. The Part concludes that,
while athletes at times have reduced rights that (in the view of most
courts) are outweighed by competing imperatives, there is no prece-
dential support for completely forbidding communication with the
press and public. Part VI analyzes the potential legal theories that a
university might offer in defense of a blanket prohibition on unautho-
rized communication with the news media. Specifically, a university
confronting a First Amendment challenge would likely argue that ath-
letes have diminished free-speech protection because they are employ-
ees or because they are students, or that athletes voluntarily waive
free-speech rights as part of the contractual bargain for receiving
scholarships and other material benefits. The Part concludes that
neither constitutional law nor contract law provides a defensible basis
for enforcing a mandatory-approval regimen before athletes may
speak with journalists. Finally, Part VII concludes with recommenda-
tions for reforming constitutionally dubious media policies across the
college athletics world.
18. See Rebecca L. Zeidel, Forecasting Disruption, Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions on
Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities, 53 B.C. L. REV. 303, 339 (2012) (ob-
serving that protecting athletes’ right to speak about coaches’ professional con-
duct “may serve an important safety function in reporting egregious conduct and
dangerous conditions”).
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II. THE CODE OF SILENCE: ATHLETES MUZZLED BY
CAMPUS SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
A. Abuse and Exploitation Proliferate in Silence
In recent years, the public has been awakened to the severity of
sexual exploitation of young athletes by coaches, often disclosed only
after years or even decades of abusive behavior. At Michigan State
University, ousted president, Lou Anna Simon, was charged with two
felonies for lying to investigators about how long MSU administrators
were aware that a medical-school faculty member, Larry Nassar, was
taking advantage of his position to molest young athletes referred to
his care by USA Gymnastics.19 Nassar is facing a lifetime behind bars
after pleading guilty to ten counts of criminal sexual conduct in two
separate prosecutions.20 This situation was first brought to light when
the Indianapolis Star reported on a nationwide pattern of abuse of
young gymnasts that the sport’s governing body ignored.21 As the
gymnastics scandal was unfolding, investigative reporters in Califor-
nia revealed that “the sexual abuse of underage swimmers by their
coaches and others in positions of power within the sport was com-
monplace and even accepted by top officials and coaches,” and that
“hundreds” of young athletes were victimized even after a top official
of USA Swimming tried, in 2005, to alert his organization to the grav-
ity of the problem.22 At the college level, accusations of molestation by
longtime OSU athletic department physician, Richard Strauss, be-
came public in the years following Strauss’s death by suicide, only af-
ter victims escalated their complaints beyond the athletic
department.23
19. Cheyna Roth, Former Michigan State President Arraigned on Charges Tied to
Larry Nassar Scandal, NPR (Nov. 26, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/
11/26/670844943/former-michigan-state-president-arraigned-on-charges-tied-to-
larry-nassar-scandal [https://perma.unl.edu/EA54-9NEZ].
20. Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar Apologizes, Gets 40 to 125 Years for Decades of Sex-
ual Abuse, CNN (Feb. 5, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/
larry-nassar-sentence-eaton/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/B8AL-GMLE];
Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar Sentenced to up to 175 Years in Prison for Decades
of Sexual Abuse, CNN (Jan. 24, 2018, 9:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/
us/larry-nassar-sentencing/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/Y3N6-3HYP].
21. Marisa Kwiatkowski et al., A Blind Eye to Sex Abuse: How USA Gymnastics
Failed to Report Cases, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Aug. 4, 2016, 5:11 AM), https://
www.indystar.com/story/news/investigations/2016/08/04/usa-gymnastics-sex-
abuse-protected-coaches/85829732/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8VSQ-V3D9].
22. Scott M. Reid, 100s of USA Swimmers Were Sexually Abused for Decades and the
People in Charge Knew and Ignored It, Investigation Finds, ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(Feb. 16, 2018, 10:59 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/02/16/investigation-
usa-swimming-ignored-sexual-abuse-for-decades/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6NMM-
KPB9].
23. Merrit Kennedy, Ohio State Doctor Sexually Abused at Least 177 Male Students,
Investigation Finds, NPR (May 17, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/
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Common to each of these scandals were victims’ initial reluctance
to blow the whistle publicly and the unresponsiveness of athletic de-
partment insiders who kept suspected wrongdoing under wraps. Ath-
letes are uniquely vulnerable to exploitation because of the cultural
norms of competitive sports which emphasize conforming to rules,
obeying authority figures, and stoically tolerating pain.24 Almost
surely, these serial abusers would have been stopped far earlier, spar-
ing generations of victims, if athletes felt empowered to take their
safety concerns to the public.
At the same time that abuse and exploitation of athletes is coming
to light, recent recruiting scandals have likewise underscored the need
for greater oversight and scrutiny over the integrity of college sports.
In September 2017, the FBI and U.S. Department of Justice an-
nounced the arrest of ten people, including four college basketball
coaches, accused of a corruption scheme that included payoffs to
coaches for steering athletes to certain agents and financial managers,
as well as payments to athletes to enroll in colleges affiliated with the
Adidas sportswear company.25 As the cases went to trial, testimony
implicated even more prominent basketball coaches not under indict-
ment including legendary Louisville national championship winner,
Rick Pitino, who was removed shortly after his Cardinals program
was identified as a participant in the payment scheme.26 The probe
shone unflattering scrutiny on some of college basketball’s biggest-
name coaches and programs, including perennial powerhouses Kan-
sas, Louisiana State University, and Arizona, and raised questions
17/724343147/ohio-state-doctor-sexually-abused-at-least-177-male-students-in-
vestigation-finds [https://perma.unl.edu/2N9P-8JJF]; Michael Vasquez, Ohio
State Sports Doctor Sexually Abused at Least 177 Men, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(May 19, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Ohio-State-Sports-Doctor/
246330 [https://perma.unl.edu/B3LC-EYMV].
24. See Lucas Novaes, Comment, It’s Time to Stop Punting on College Athletes’
Rights: Implications of Columbia University on the Collective Bargaining Rights
of College Athletes, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1533, 1537–38 (2017) (“[C]ollege athletes
have no substantial rights as amateur athletes, are subjected to prohibitive con-
trol at the hands of their coaches, universities, and respective leagues, all the
while enduring some of the most laborious work on college campuses.”).
25. Lauren Thomas, FBI Arrests NCAA Basketball Coaches and Adidas Rep in Brib-
ery Probe Involving Recruitment, CNBC (Sept. 26, 2017, 3:12 PM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2017/09/26/ncaa-basketball-officials-arrested-on-fraud-and-corruption-
charges.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2YJH-BB9K].
26. Mark Schlabach, Three Sentenced in Adidas Recruiting Scandal, ESPN (Mar. 5,
2019), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/26141993/three-
sentenced-adidas-recruiting-scandal [https://perma.unl.edu/6GFC-UNCL]; Phil-
lip M. Bailey & Andrew Wolfson, Rick Pitino ‘Effectively Fired,’ on Unpaid Leave
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about the integrity of a sport seemingly pervaded by illicit recruiting
practices.27
When they feel safe and empowered to do so, athletes can effec-
tively advocate for social and political causes with the benefit of their
public platform and following. At the University of Missouri, the
threat of a walkout by the Tigers football team was a pivotal pressure
point in forcing the ouster of Chancellor Tim Wolfe who had mis-
handled instances of racial hostility.28 NFL quarterback Colin
Kaepernick’s silent act of kneeling to protest incidents of police brutal-
ity against unarmed black people provoked a wave of lookalike pro-
tests by college athletes and cheerleaders from coast to coast.29
Because athletes have a demonstrated interest in being heard on
contemporary issues, and because it is increasingly apparent that ath-
letes are vulnerable to mistreatment and exploitation by trusted au-
thority figures, the legal system must protect athletes’ ability to speak
out about issues of public concern, including issues within the athletic
program. However, university policies frequently discourage athletes
from going public with their concerns.
B. Public University Athletic Departments Tightly Control
Athletes’ Speech to the News Media
Jordan McNair, a highly sought-after athlete recruited to play of-
fensive line for the University of Maryland Terrapins, collapsed on the
27. See Jerry Brewer, Punishing Kansas Might Elicit Fear, but the NCAA Will Need




Norlander, College Basketball Corruption Trial: Wiretaps Show Payments
Wanted to Recruit Zion Williamson, Marvin Bagley III, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 25,
2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/college-bas
ketball-corruption-trial-wiretaps-show-payments-wanted-to-recruit-zion-william-
son-marvin-bagley-iii/ [https://perma.unl.edu/9BD4-NCG3].
28. Philip Bump, How the Missouri Football Team Just Took Down Its University
President, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2015, 10:07 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/09/missouri-football-players-and-the-untap-
ped-political-power-of-the-college-student-athlete/ [https://perma.unl.edu/WZR9-
QVJJ]; see also James Hefferan, Picking up the Flag? The University of Missouri
Football Team and Whether Intercollegiate Student-Athletes May Be Penalized for
Exercising Their First Amendment Rights, 12 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 44, 75–76 (2016) (noting that boycotting Missouri football players had
their coach’s support and were not punished, and that any punishment likely
would have run afoul of the First Amendment whether the Tinker disruption
standard or a more protective standard applies).
29. Susan Svrluga, Some College Students Keep Taking the Knee, Too, WASH. POST
(Oct. 16, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/
2017/10/16/some-college-students-keep-taking-the-knee-too/ [https://perma.
unl.edu/XQX7-V79Q].
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practice field on May 29, 2018, suffering symptoms of heat stroke. He
died in the hospital fifteen days later at the age of nineteen.30 Mc-
Nair’s death brought to light both tragic missteps in the team’s lack of
urgency in seeking lifesaving medical attention as well as deeper cul-
tural issues pervading the football program.31 An exhaustive, 192-
page investigative report by a commission of outside experts deter-
mined that Maryland’s coaches and athletic department fostered “a
culture where problems festered because too many players feared
speaking out,” even when members of the coaching staff subjected
them to serious physical and verbal mistreatment.32
Across college sports, coaches and athletic departments rigidly con-
trol how athletes communicate with the public in ways that would
never be countenanced if applied to non-athletes. At perennial power-
house Penn State, journalists seeking reactions to the departure of the
Nittany Lions’ head football coach were told that “[p]er school policy,
players are prohibited from speaking to the media without permis-
sion.”33 Kansas State University prohibited members of its equestrian
team from responding to media inquiries about the impending cancel-
lation of the sport, relying on an athletic department policy that in-
structs athletes: “You don’t take part in an interview unless it has
been approved and scheduled by a member of the communications
staff or your head coach. . . . Always speak positively about program,
teammates and coaches.”34 Football coaches commonly tell players
that they will never be granted permission to speak to the media dur-
ing their first year, including those at the University of Alabama, Col-
30. Jesse Dougherty, Experts Say Maryland May Not Have Acted Quickly Enough to




31. See Michael McCann, How Do the Findings of Jordan McNair Investigation Im-
pact Pending Lawsuit, Durkin’s Future?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 22, 2018),
https://www.si.com/college/2018/09/22/jordan-mcnair-death-investigation-find
ings-maryland-dj-durkin-lawsuit [https://perma.unl.edu/9ZJJ-ZTKE].
32. Rick Maese & Keith L. Alexander, Report on Maryland Football Culture Cites
Problems but Stops Short of ‘Toxic’ Label, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2018, 7:42 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2018/10/25/report-maryland-football-cul
ture-cites-problems-stops-short-toxic-label/ [https://perma.unl.edu/MXR4-JT4S].
33. Chris Adamski, Penn State Prepares for New Era, as O’Brien Leaves for NFL
Position, TRIB LIVE (Jan. 1, 2014, 2:57 PM), https://archive.triblive.com/news/
penn-state-prepares-for-new-era-as-obrien-leaves-for-nfl-position/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/LE4B-8P3S].
34. Celia Llopis-Jepsen, First Amendment Lawyers Pan K-State Athletics Policy, TO-
PEKA CAP.-J. (Dec. 7, 2014, 5:10 PM), https://www.cjonline.com/news/2014-12-07/
first-amendment-lawyers-pan-k-state-athletics-policy [https://perma.unl.edu/
VZV6-TKKU].
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orado State University, and the University of South Carolina.35
Alabama’s legendary head coach, Nick Saban, explained his rationale
as preventing inexperienced players from making missteps: “I’m for
protecting our players and helping them develop. . . . We eventually
want that guy to be able to talk to the media and do a good job with
it.”36
When athletes are able to speak out, they can get results. Rutgers
fired its basketball coach following incriminating media reports in
2013 and parted ways with the coach of its women’s swimming team
after current and former athletes and their families told journalists
about abusive behavior, including pressuring athletes not to take pre-
scribed medications (although the university ultimately cleared the
coach and found no wrongdoing).37 A Penn State gymnastics coach re-
signed after a member of the 2016 women’s team told the campus
newspaper that the coaching staff belittled and body-shamed athletes,
pressuring them to practice through injuries and lose weight.38
Grambling State football players attracted nationwide attention in
2013 after boycotting a game in protest of squalid conditions in their
locker room and workout facilities and the firing of their popular head
coach.39 Still, it’s rare for athletes—especially current athletes—to
break publicly with their athletic programs.
35. See John Del Bianco, “Next Man Up” on Defense is Running Out of Options, BIG
SPUR (Nov. 24, 2018), https://247sports.com/college/south-carolina/Article/South-
Carolina-football-Gamecocks-defense-injuries-freshman-playing—125298830/
[https://perma.unl.edu/EAG3-CYNC]; Andrew Gribble, The Plaxico Effect: Why
Alabama Freshmen Don’t Speak with Reporters, AL.COM (Oct. 22, 2012), https://
www.al.com/alabamafootball/2012/10/the_plaxico_effect_why_alabama.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/8L2E-LZPD]; John Keilman, Bad Grades, Low Test Scores
Can Scramble Signing Day Plans, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/sports/ct-xpm-2013-02-06-ct-met-football-vagabonds-20130206-
story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/H7U9-H3Y4].
36. Gribble, supra note 35.
37. Keith Sargeant, Amid Bullying Allegations, Rutgers Coach Fired for ‘Mike Rice
Tactics’, NJ.COM (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nj.com/rutgersfootball/2017/11/
rutgers_fires_swimming_coach_accused_of_mike_rice.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/N7MG-JYZ3]; Keith Sargeant, Rutgers Settles with Swim Coach
for $725K, Paying 3 Times What It Owed, NJ.COM (Dec. 14, 2018), https://
www.nj.com/sports/2018/12/rutgers-settles-with-swim-coach-for-725k-paying-
three-times-what-it-owed.html [https://perma.unl.edu/CP7R-64TU].
38. Nick Martin, Former Penn State Gymnasts Detail Alleged Abuse by Coaches,
WASH. POST (May 31, 2016, 6:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
early-lead/wp/2016/05/31/former-penn-state-gymnasts-detail-alleged-abuse-by-
coaches/ [https://perma.unl.edu/246H-BSTJ]; Rennie Dyball, Penn State Gym-
nasts Allege Emotional Abuse, Body-Shaming Against Coaches: ‘They Took Every-
thing Away from Me’, PEOPLE (May 31, 2016, 2:15 PM), https://people.com/sports/
penn-state-womens-gymnastics-coaches-accused-of-emotional-abuse-body-sham-
ing/ [https://perma.unl.edu/57YM-539Z].
39. Greg Bishop, At Grambling, a Proud Football Program at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
25, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/26/sports/ncaafootball/at-grambling-
a-proud-football-program-at-risk.html [https://perma.unl.edu/LSA7-REWW].
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Researchers from the Brechner Center for Freedom of Information
sent public records requests to the eighty-four largest state universi-
ties in America, representing those with undergraduate enrollment of
20,000 or greater, asking for copies of any policies, rulebooks, or agree-
ments governing athletes’ interaction with the news media.40 Institu-
tions that failed to respond within thirty days received a follow-up
email directed to the designated public-records custodian. Of the
eighty-four institutions, fifty-six responded with copies of, or links to,
documents (66.6%), fifteen responded that no responsive documents
existed (17.9%), and thirteen failed to respond at all (15.5%).41 Media
policies were readily findable online for two of the thirteen non-re-
sponding institutions which produced a total of fifty-eight policies to
review.
Of the fifty-eight policies, fifty of them (86% of all policies ex-
amined, and 59.5% of the schools surveyed) contained some form of
gatekeeping rule restricting interactions with the media. The real
number is almost certainly higher because several universities that
claimed to have no responsive documents stated that coaches instruct
their players verbally on how to handle media requests. Essentially
every one of the fifty restrictive policies identified categorically prohib-
ited speaking to the news media without approval from a coach or ath-
letic department staff member. Policies typically instruct athletes
that, if contacted by a reporter, they must refer the reporter to the
athletic department’s Sports Information or Media Relations office
which will decide whether to approve the interview.
The wording of the policies varies from explicitly restrictive of any
unapproved interaction with the news media to less explicitly restric-
tive. Illustrative examples of the range of wording include:
“Do not conduct any interview not arranged by the Communications Of-
fice. . . . Do not conduct an interview over the telephone unless you are in-
structed to do so by the Communications Office.”42
“Scholar-athletes should decline all phone interviews with the media unless it
has been cleared through the media relations office. Should a scholar-athlete
be contacted (phone, email, social media, in-person, etc.) by a member of the
40. Public universities were chosen because they are subject to the First Amendment
and to state open-records laws.
41. Several of the non-responses were based on statutory exceptions that allow agen-
cies to refuse requests from nonresidents. Such statutes are codified in Alabama,
Arkansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Virginia. Supreme
Court: States Can Prohibit Non-Residents from Using Public Records Laws to
Gather Information, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Apr. 29, 2013),
https://www.rcfp.org/supreme-court-states-can-prohibit-non-residents-using-pub-
lic-records/ [https://perma.unl.edu/52JK-YQ3S].
42. UNIV. OF ARK., 2019–2020 RAZORBACKS ACADEMIC CALENDAR & PLANNER 44
(2019), https://arkansasrazorbacks.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019-2020-
Student-Athlete-Handbook-Updated.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZP45-WSEP].
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media, please ask that reporter to call the media relations office to coordinate
the interview.”43
“Student-athletes are asked to only grant interviews when they have been
pre-arranged by a member of the media relations staff.”44
While most of the responding institutions provided policies from
the central Athletic Department level, a few indicated that the policies
are set and enforced individually by each coach. One such institution
was the University of Nebraska which, in response to a public records
request, produced links to athletic department handbooks for nine
sports, each of which contains a variation of the same passage in-
structing athletes to forward any media inquiries to the Athletic De-
partment’s Communications office.45
Almost unanimously, university policies forbid athletes from giv-
ing journalists their personal contract information, even when jour-
nalists ask for the information to check facts or pose follow-up
questions.46 These and other restrictions on athletes’ communications
commonly are rationalized as an attempt to manage distractions or to
keep athletes from unwittingly sharing information with gambling op-
erations or other unsavory outsiders.47
Many of the policies are contained in handbooks or manuals that
are directed to the athletes themselves and phrased in second-person
(“you must” or “do not”) language. But others are incorporated into the
general policies of the athletic department or its communications of-
fice, making it unclear whether they are regarded as binding on ath-
43. UNIV. OF SAN DIEGO, SCHOLAR-ATHLETE HANDBOOK: 2019–2020 49 (2019), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/usdtoreros.com/documents/2018/9/18/Handbook_Plan-
ner_18_19.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/S8T8-79DN].
44. WASH. ST. ATHLETICS, STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 18 (2014), https://wsucou-
gars.com/documents/2016/6/19/3221040.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Q794-CC9X].
45. See, e.g., UNIV. OF NEB., Nebraska Men’s Tennis: Communications Guide 2 (2018)
(“Please, only do interviews that have been arranged by a member of the Commu-
nications staff. . . . If you are contacted directly by a reporter, ask that person to
arrange the interview through our office.”).
46. See, e.g., COLO. ST. UNIV., COLORADO STATE RAMS STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK
2018–2019 44 (2018), https://csurams.com/documents/2018/10/26//2018_19_Colo-
rado_State_Student_Athlete_Handbook.pdf?id=9722 [https://perma.unl.edu/
QR5U-V7YB] (“Student-athletes should never give their contact information to a
media representative for any reason.”); MICH. ST. UNIV., 2019–2020 STUDENT-
ATHLETE HANDBOOK AND PLANNER 43 (2019) (produced in response to FOI re-
quest, copy on file with authors) (“Please do not take or make calls to reporters
from your cell phone. Once they have your number, they will have it forever, and
reporters on deadline sometimes get desperate for quotes at the last minute.”).
47. The University of Georgia, for example, tells athletes not to agree to telephone
interviews with unknown people unless arranged through the athletic depart-
ment: “This is to avoid contact with unauthorized persons who may attempt to
gain & use information for gambling purposes.” UNIV. OF GA., PRESS RELATIONS
FOR THE STUDENT-ATHLETE (produced in response to FOI request, copy on file
with authors).
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letes and enforceable by discipline or directed to news organizations.
Rutgers University’s policies are typical, specifying: “All interviews
must be arranged through the Athletic Communications office at least
a day in advance.”48 It is uncertain whether the university would treat
an unapproved interview as an act of misconduct by the athlete or by
the journalist. However, the same document goes on to specify that
acceptance of a media credential requires compliance with all univer-
sity and conference rules, and that violations may be punished by ex-
pulsion from a sporting event, ineligibility for press credentials, and
loss of workspace in Rutgers athletic venues, suggesting it would be
the journalist who suffers the penalty.49 UCLA is more direct, stating
in its Athletic Department policies that “[a]ll requests to interview
coaches, staff, student-athletes, or their families must be submitted
through the Athletic Communications Office” and specifying the con-
sequences to noncompliant journalists by stating that “[v]iolation[s] of
this policy via direct outreach may result in denial or limitation of
future access.”50
The authority of athletic departments to impose punitive conse-
quences on journalists, rather than athletes, for violating a proscrip-
tion against unapproved interviews is beyond the scope of this
research. As a general matter, denying a journalist access to an other-
wise-available benefit or privilege based on viewpoint can be an ac-
tionable First Amendment violation.51 However, it is less certain that
a journalist could mount a First Amendment claim if punished for vio-
lating a policy against directly contacting athletes that is not facially
based on “content” or “viewpoint.”52
48. RUTGERS UNIV., RUTGERS UNIVERSITY ATHLETIC COMMUNICATIONS, POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (2019) (produced in response to FOI request, copy on file with
authors).
49. See id.
50. Athletic Communications, UCLA, https://uclabruins.com/sports/2018/11/20/ucla-
athletic-communications.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/6GTS-ES6W] (last visited
Mar. 2, 2020).
51. See Stevens v. New York Racing Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (denial
of media credential to shoot photographs at racetrack); Sherrill v. Knight, 569
F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denial of White House press pass); see also Rob Ar-
camona, Colleges Run Afoul of First Amendment in Barring Sports Journalists,
MEDIASHIFT (Sept. 28, 2011), http://mediashift.org/2011/09/colleges-run-afoul-of-
first-amendment-in-barring-sports-journalists271/ [https://perma.unl.edu/27R3-
ZHN2] (cataloguing instances in which college athletic programs used credential-
ing authority to retaliate against journalists perceived as overly critical, and
opining that the First Amendment prohibits unequal treatment of journalists
based on their viewpoints or their publications).
52. There appear to be no reported cases in which journalists have challenged
credentialing decisions based not on their coverage but on their reporting tactics,
so it is difficult to predict how a court might receive a First Amendment challenge
if a news organization was deprived of access to sporting events as punishment
for contacting an athlete after being instructed otherwise. For more about the
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Some athletic department rules include explicit content-based
prohibitions that forbid whistleblowing. At Iowa State University, for
example, football players are told: “Do not take your complaints to the
newspaper. The coaches’ office is the only place for these. Keep it in
the family.”53 Kent State University’s athlete handbook similarly pro-
vides: “Don’t take your complaints to the media. The coaches’ office is
the only place for these.”54 Texas Tech University produced a policy
document that instructs football players: “Anything that happens with
this team—anything within the program or locker room—stays with
the football program and in the locker room.”55 East Carolina Univer-
sity emphatically cautions: “If you do not have anything good to say,
do not say anything at all. DO NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT THE
COACHES, TEAMMATES OR THE UNIVERSITY.”56
The University of Oregon (UO), a perennial Top 25 football power
in the Pac-10 conference, presents an especially vivid case study. Dur-
ing 2016, reporters for the Daily Emerald student newspaper sought
to speak with members of the Ducks football team about a star player,
Pharaoh Brown, who had been investigated by local police after a fight
with his girlfriend at an off-campus apartment.57 Reporters from the
Daily Emerald contacted two teammates believed to have had locker-
room altercations with Brown, one of whom spoke at length about
their fight and one of whom cited athletic department policy in declin-
ing to comment.58 The story attracted widespread media attention be-
cause of Brown’s prominence and won a prestigious national
investigative reporting award.59
But the story also provoked the ire of the UO athletic department.
The lead writer, Kenny Jacoby, was reprimanded and told that the
First Amendment in the context of media credentialing, see Ryan Benjamin
Witte, It’s My News Too! Online Journalism and Discriminatory Access to the
Congressional Periodical Press Gallery, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 208 (2010).
53. IOWA ST. UNIV., MEDIA POLICIES 19 (produced in response to FOI request, copy on
file with authors).
54. KENT ST. UNIV., KENT STATE UNIVERSITY ATHLETICS STUDENT-ATHLETE HAND-
BOOK 53 (2018) (produced in response to FOI request, copy on file with authors).
55. TEX. TECH UNIV., WORKING WITH THE MEDIA (produced in response to FOI re-
quest, copy on file with authors).
56. EAST CAROLINA UNIV., MEDIA INTERVIEW TIPS & REMINDERS (produced in response
to FOI request, copy on file with authors).
57. Kenny Jacoby, Cooper Green & Jarrid Denney, Oregon Tight End Pharaoh
Brown Accused of Three Acts of Violence Since October 2014, DAILY EMERALD




59. Jack Pitcher, Emerald Story Wins National Investigative Reporting Award, DAILY
EMERALD (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.dailyemerald.com/archives/emerald-story-
wins-national-investigative-reporting-award/article_f7cc1c4d-464b-5b85-85e3-
3bdd9cd73d86.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9F6F-BELZ].
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department considered penalizing the newspaper for defying the pro-
hibition against speaking to athletes by revoking a press credential for
an upcoming basketball game.60 When the university was criticized
for its hardball stance toward the journalists, UO’s vice president and
general counsel, Kevin S. Reed, undertook a study of the rights of jour-
nalists and athletes and how UO’s policies compared with those of
other institutions.61
In March 2017, Reed reported back to the university’s president,
concluding that the athletic department’s prohibition on direct contact
with journalists was constitutionally defensible.62 The Reed Report
reached its legal conclusion by distinction from the Supreme Court’s
Press-Enterprise doctrine, which states that journalists have a First
Amendment right of access to courtroom proceedings if the proceed-
ings have traditionally been open to the public and public access sig-
nificantly benefits the functioning of the process.63 The report
surveyed the policies of eight fellow members of the Pac-10 athletic
conference and found only one, the University of Arizona, where ath-
letes were told they could speak directly with the news media without
needing approval from the athletic department.64
The Reed Report’s authors did not regard the pre-approval policy
as constraining athletes’ ability to speak to the media. “We find no
evidence to support the allegation that the Athletic Department re-
stricts student athletes’ ability to address the media. Rather, the me-
dia relations professionals in the Athletic Department seem to serve
the interests of student athletes by helping them manage the media’s
access to them.”65 The report acknowledged that retaliating against
journalists by revoking credentials could be a constitutional violation
and that multiple journalists reported experiencing threats; however,
the report did not conclude that any retaliatory revocation actually
took place and did not recommend a formal policy change.66
According to a document furnished by UO in response to a request
under the Oregon Public Records Law, the athletic department’s
gatekeeping rule remains in place. The policy says nothing about ath-
60. Austin Meek, Emerald Dispute Results in Policy Review, REG.-GUARD (Jan. 13,




62. KEVIN S. REED & HAILEY CZARNECKI, U. OF OR., MEDIA ACCESS TO STUDENT ATH-




63. Id. at 15 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986)).
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 17.
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letes’ right of free expression and instead states that “[a]ll interviews
and communications with the media should be coordinated through
the Athletics Communications office. If a student-athlete is contacted
directly for an interview, without their previous knowledge, they
should refer the request to the Athletic Communications office.”67
Notably, none of the policies obtained from college athletic depart-
ments specified any punitive consequences for speaking to the news
media without approval.68 However, a number of athletic department
manuals, handbooks, and scholarship agreements provide generically
for penalties, including loss of athletic scholarships, for defying ath-
letic-program rules, which presumably would include the rule against
unauthorized interviews.69
Whatever the consequences (real or perceived) for violating univer-
sities’ prohibitions on interviewing, the restrictions appear to be pro-
ducing the intended result: college athletes will not talk to journalists
without approval from their coaches or athletic departments. The
Brechner Center worked with AP Sports Editors, a nationwide mem-
bership organization of sports journalists across all media, on a survey
of members’ experiences with university interviewing policies. Of
thirty-two sports editors who responded to a survey, none of them said
that they are always free to speak to the college athletes they cover
without needing clearance from the institution; eleven responses
(34%) reported that they “sometimes” need authorization to interview
college athletes; and twenty-one responses (66%) said that they “al-
ways” need authorization. Only three respondents (9%) said that
when they ask for the institution’s assistance in arranging an inter-
view they are “always” able to get the access they need; twenty-one
(66%) said they were “occasionally” unable to get access; and eight
(25%) said they were “regularly” unable to get the interviews they
67. UNIV. OF OR., UNIVERSITY OF OREGON STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 2019–2020
32 (2019) (copy on file with authors) (boldface removed).
68. This is consistent with the assertion in the Reed Report that no UO athlete sur-
veyed by the university reported experiencing any adverse consequence for hav-
ing spoken to the media. See REED REPORT, supra note 62, at 13.
69. For example, in response to a public-records request, Ohio University provided a
copy of its standard Intercollegiate Athletics Scholarship Agreement which speci-
fies that, to maintain eligibility for a scholarship, the athlete must comply with
all guidelines and policies established by the athletic department and coaching
staff, including those in the Student-Athlete Handbook. OHIO UNIV., INTERCOLLE-
GIATE ATHLETICS SCHOLARSHIP AGREEMENT (copy on file with author). Texas State
University similarly tells its athletes in the scholarship (Athletics Grant-in-Aid)
agreement that their scholarships may be reduced or revoked if they “[f]ail to
meet the athletic and academic expectations, including, but not limited to, all
ethical conduct provisions, team policies, athletics support obligations, etc. as
presented in team, Athletics department, institutional, Sun Belt and/or NCAA
rules, policies or standards.” TEX. ST. UNIV., ATHLETICS GRANT-IN-AID AGREEMENT
1 (copy on file with author).
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needed. When asked whether the inability to get access to interviews
with college athletes had diminished the quality of their coverage,
three of the respondents (9%) said it had not; twenty-two respondents
(69%) said that it “sometimes” affected their coverage; and seven
respondentss (22%) said that their coverage “often” was adversely
affected.
Plainly, university athletic departments believe they have the au-
thority to control athletes’ interactions with the press and public, and
make no effort to disguise that they do so. The question is whether
these policies are legally defensible given decades of First Amendment
precedent that disfavors granting government regulators open-ended
authority to decide whose speech gets to be heard.
III. CAMPUS AND WORKPLACE SPEECH RIGHTS
A. The First Amendment and Prior Restraints
As a general principle, the First Amendment rigidly confines the
government’s authority to enforce content-based restrictions on
speech. Apart from a handful of recognized categories of constitution-
ally unprotected speech, including credible threats of violence and ob-
scenity, the government may not prevent or punish speech based on
the speaker’s message.70 In particular, the First Amendment is under-
stood to protect the ability to address political issues of public concern,
even when the speaker’s words are highly offensive or extreme.71
The government may enforce reasonable regulations on the “time,
place and manner” of speakers’ expression, so long as the regulations
are drawn and applied without regard to content.72 The regulation
need not be the least speech-restrictive means of accomplishing the
70. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regula-
tions are presumptively invalid.” (citing Simon v. Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991))); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (“[W]hen the government, acting as censor,
undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly
limits its power.”).
71. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454–55 (2011) (finding that demonstrators’
anti-gay hate speech was constitutionally protected because it condemned per-
missive societal attitudes toward gays and lesbians, a matter of public concern);
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (finding that “outra-
geous” magazine parody of conservative political figure was protected speech: “At
the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental impor-
tance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and
concern.”).
72. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding
that a government agency may enforce reasonable restrictions affecting expres-
sive conduct, so long as the restrictions are “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
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government’s objective, but it must be “narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest.”73 Even a content-neutral regula-
tion may be overturned if it has the effect of closing off so many ave-
nues for speech that a speaker has no reasonable opportunity to reach
the intended audience.74
A facially content-neutral policy—like a public university’s policy
against granting interviews to the news media—is vulnerable to con-
stitutional challenge on two primary grounds. First, that it is an un-
duly broad “prior restraint” on speech that is unjustified by any
compelling governmental interest. Second, that it violates due process
by conferring unbridled discretion to grant or withhold approval to
speak, inviting retaliatory or viewpoint-discriminatory decisions.
A “prior restraint” that prevents speech from reaching its intended
audience is considered an especially extreme form of regulation.75 A
regulation that restrains speech from being heard, as opposed to im-
posing after-the-fact consequences if the speech causes damage, is re-
viewed with “a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional
validity.”76 Because prior restraints can delay the dissemination of
time-sensitive news, they threaten “immediate and irreversible in-
jury” to the would-be speaker.77 As the Supreme Court has explained:
[T]he distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to
throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in ad-
vance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegit-
imate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship
are formidable.78
When a prior restraint is challenged as unconstitutional, federal
courts apply “strict scrutiny,” putting the burden on the regulator to
show that the restriction was narrowly tailored to address an espe-
for communication of the information” (citing City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 79 (1984))).
73. Id.
74. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977)
(finding that municipality’s ban on yard signs did not leave real-estate sellers
sufficient alternative channels to market to their intended audience because al-
ternatives such as sound trucks or leafleting campaigns would cost more and be
less effective).
75. See Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doc-
trine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989) (“[P]rior restraints are so
strongly disfavored that labeling a law as a prior restraint on speech is tanta-
mount to a declaration that the law is unconstitutional.”).
76. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (quoting Carroll v.
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968)).
77. Jeffrey Matrullo, Comment, People v. Bryant and Prior Restraint: The Unsettling
of a Settled Area of Law, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 320, 326 (2005).
78. See Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (citing Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
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cially compelling government objective.79 Although prior restraints
are often described in terms of a “licensing” system to use public prop-
erty, as in the case of a permit to hold a demonstration,80 the doctrine
is quite a bit broader. It encompasses any system enforced by any
branch of government that forbids speech or requires permission from
a government official before speaking.81
As the Supreme Court’s modern understanding of the First
Amendment was just taking shape, the Court decided what would
prove to be a landmark freedom of the press case in Near v. Minne-
sota.82 The Near case tested the constitutionality of a Minnesota stat-
ute enabling law enforcement agencies to enjoin the distribution of
newspapers and magazines regarded as “malicious, scandalous and
defamatory.”83 The county attorney in Minneapolis invoked the stat-
ute to obtain an injunction against continued publication of a periodi-
cal known for its vituperative attacks on the city’s elected officials,
police, and other newspapers.84 The publishers conceded that they
had distributed defamatory material but insisted that the First
Amendment distinguishes between imposing after-the-fact liability for
damaging statements (which is permissible) versus a “prior restraint”
against publishing statements feared to be defamatory (which is
not).85 A 5–4 majority of the Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes ex-
plained that a foundational purpose of the First Amendment is to pre-
vent government authorities from restraining citizens from exposing
official misconduct: “The recognition of authority to impose previous
restraint upon publication in order to protect the community against
the circulation of charges of misconduct, and especially of official mis-
conduct, necessarily would carry with it the admission of the authority
of the censor against which the constitutional barrier was erected.”86
Since Near, the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down statutes
considered to be “prior restraints.”87 Perhaps most notably, the Court
79. See, e.g., Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2018); Burk v. Augusta-
Richmond Cty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004).
80. See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (characteriz-
ing a Georgia county’s ordinance requiring a permit and a fee to obtain authoriza-
tion for public speaking, parades, or assemblies as a prior restraint on speech).
81. See generally Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a
Complete Definition of Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1096–132 (2001)
(explaining scenarios in which courts have determined that government-imposed
hurdles to speech represent “prior restraints”).
82. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
83. Id. at 701.
84. Id. at 703.
85. Id. at 730 (Butler, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 721 (majority opinion).
87. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (statute restricting door-to-
door distribution of religious materials without state approval); Niemotko v. Ma-
106 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:86
invoked the prior-restraint standard in the landmark “Pentagon Pa-
pers” case, denying the federal government an injunction to prevent
journalists from publishing a leaked classified history of the Vietnam
War.88
The Court elaborated on the prior-restraint doctrine in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, where the restraint was imposed judicially
rather than legislatively.89 There, the Court found that a trial judge
violated the First Amendment when, attempting to keep incriminat-
ing information from tainting the jury pool, he ordered news organiza-
tions not to publish anything about the suspects’ confessions. The
Court explained:
[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. . . .
A prior restraint . . . has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can
be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication ‘chills’
speech, prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for the time.90
Time and again, the Court has recognized that the mere existence
of a “permission” system is constitutionally suspect, if only because it
interferes with spontaneous speech in response to time-sensitive
events. As the justices wrote in throwing out a city ordinance that re-
quired a permit to engage in door-to-door political or religious advo-
cacy, “[i]t is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First
Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—that in the con-
text of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the gov-
ernment of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a
permit to do so.”91
In the rare instances that a prior restraint has been found tolera-
ble—such as, during the 1960s, prescreening motion pictures for ob-
scenity—the Supreme Court has required rigorous procedural
safeguards. In Freedman v. Maryland, the Court found that, to be con-
stitutional, a state pre-approval process must put the burden on the
censor to demonstrate that the speech is unprotected, strictly limit the
review period, and provide for prompt judicial appeal.92
Even where a regulation restricting speech furthers an important
government purpose, it still may be unconstitutional if it is so broad
ryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (park commissioner’s policy requiring permission to
use park for prayer meetings); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147 (1969) (ordinance requiring permits for parades).
88. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
89. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
90. Id. at 559.
91. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165–66 (2002).
92. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965).
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that it inflicts collateral harm on benign speech.93 A law may be inval-
idated as facially overbroad if “a substantial number of its applica-
tions are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.”94
Open-ended restrictions on the content of speech also are vulnera-
ble to challenge under the Due Process Clause. A regulation may be
declared void for vagueness if it fails to give intelligible notice of the
behavior that will result in penalties.95 Vague regulations on speech
offend the Constitution because, uncertain about whether their ex-
pression is punishable, speakers will self-censor to stay far from the
indistinct line of punishability.96 A regulation also may be struck
down as unconstitutionally vague if it delegates unfettered enforce-
ment discretion to the executive, inviting arbitrary or discriminatory
application.97 Licensing or permitting systems that lack meaningful
constraints on the decision-maker’s authority are strongly disfavored
because “in the area of free expression a licensing statute placing un-
bridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency con-
stitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship.”98
The Supreme Court first recognized in Hague v. Committee for In-
dustrial Organization99 that open-ended permitting systems offend
the First Amendment because they enable the decisionmaker to ration
the right to speak based on subjective, and potentially viewpoint-dis-
criminatory, considerations. The Hague case challenged the decision
of a New Jersey police department to deny applications from Commu-
93. Hays Cty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Even a legiti-
mate government interest cannot justify a restriction if the restriction accom-
plishes that goal at an inordinate cost to speech.”).
94. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6
(2008) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982)).
95. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation, violates the first essential of due process of law.”); see also NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963) (observing, in invalidating a Virginia statute
interpreted as preventing the NAACP from soliciting civil-rights clients, that “a
vague and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular
causes”).
96. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
97. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (invalidating mu-
nicipal ordinance that gave police no objective standards by which to issue or
deny permits for demonstrations, finding that the ordinance invited selective en-
forcement based on the speaker’s viewpoint).
98. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) (citations
omitted). As the Court explained in City of Lakewood, facial challenges to permit-
ting systems on the basis of unfettered discretion will be liberally entertained,
even before any adverse government action takes place, because such a system
risks intimidating speakers into self-censoring out of fear of government retalia-
tion. See id. at 758.
99. Hague, 307 U.S. 496.
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nist political groups to use a municipal meeting hall, relying on an
ordinance that empowered the police chief to withhold a permit “for
the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assem-
blage.”100 The Court struck down the permitting ordinance finding
that, without objective standards to constrain the police chief’s exer-
cise of authority, the ordinance could “be made the instrument of arbi-
trary suppression of free expression.”101
Similarly, in Cox v. Louisiana,102 the Supreme Court vacated a
civil-rights demonstrator’s conviction on a charge of obstructing a pub-
lic sidewalk because the statute under which he was convicted gave
“unfettered discretion” to municipal authorities to decide which uses
of public property for expressive purposes were or were not punisha-
ble. Writing for the Court’s 7–2 majority, Justice Arthur Goldberg
found that the statute, while facially neutral, had in fact been applied
in a discriminatory way:
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which
expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in invidi-
ous discrimination among persons or groups either by use of a statute provid-
ing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the
equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad
prohibitory statute.103
To be constitutional, any permitting system imposed as a condition of
speech must cabin the decisionmaker’s discretion with “neutral crite-
ria to insure that the . . . licensing decision is not based on the content
or viewpoint of the speech being considered.”104
While these constitutional principles strictly constrain govern-
ment’s ability to interdict or punish speech in most settings, federal
courts have created workarounds in the settings of school and the
workplace. In those contexts, courts are somewhat more deferential to
government, recognizing that the government needs latitude to effec-
tively manage its own programs and institutions.
100. Id. at 502 n.1.
101. Id. at 516.
102. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
103. Id. at 557–58.
104. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988); see also
Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (“Where the licensing official
enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit,
there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content.”); Trey
Hatch, Keep on Rockin’ in the Free World: A First Amendment Analysis of En-
tertainment Permit Schemes, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 313, 320–21 (2003) (explain-
ing that, to be constitutional, a licensing system “must not grant unbridled
discretion to decision-makers, but rather must incorporate narrow, objective, and
definite standards or limits to guide their decision”).
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B. The First Amendment (Sometimes) Goes to College
1. Content-Based Punishment for Disruptive Speech
Students in public schools and colleges have the benefit of some
constitutional protections that are enforceable against their institu-
tions.105 The First Amendment protects students’ ability to express
themselves free from government restraint or retaliation, while the
Due Process Clause assures that they may not be deprived of the ben-
efits of a public education arbitrarily or without adequate notice.
Although student-speech cases regularly find their way into fed-
eral court, no case has presented anything resembling a facial over-
breadth challenge to a regulation prohibiting students from talking to
the media. The framework developed by federal courts in the more
commonplace scenario—a student disciplined for speech that a school
or college deems unsuitable—offers some limited insight into how a
First Amendment case by silenced athletes might fare. But, the anal-
ogy is imperfect because a preemptive restraint on an entire class of
speakers will be harder to justify than after-the-fact punishment of a
single speaker.
The Supreme Court has not comprehensively addressed whether
college students have the full benefit of the First Amendment rights
that, in the off-campus world, foreclose content-based restrictions ab-
sent extreme exceptions. While the Court has spoken expansively of
the importance of the free exchange of ideas on a university cam-
pus,106 the few college-speech cases to reach the Court have been de-
cided on relatively narrow grounds, making it difficult to discern any
universally applicable standards. For instance, a public university
may not exclude religious-themed publications from competing for fi-
nancial support on equal terms with non-religious publications.107
Nor may universities withdraw student activity fee support from stu-
105. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) (holding that, for purposes of a
due process claim, “[a] state university without question is a state actor”).
106. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (overturning New
York’s requirement that college employees sign a loyalty oath forswearing affilia-
tion with the Communist Party and declaring that a college classroom is “pecu-
liarly the ‘marketplace of ideas’”). As the Court elaborated in Keyishian: “Our
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of tran-
scendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That free-
dom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Id. See also Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“Yet, the precedents of this Court leave no
room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amend-
ment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large. Quite to the contrary, ‘the vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.’” (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960))).
107. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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dent clubs just because some dissenting students do not share the
clubs’ political ideology.108
First Amendment standards are more sharply defined in the realm
of K-12 education. In its landmark, Vietnam-era case, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, the Court rejected
the notion that public school authorities may prohibit speech purely to
avoid controversy or the sharp exchange of differing views.109 A school
may not enforce a content-based prohibition on speech, the Court held,
unless the speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”110
Since Tinker, the Court has recognized several categories of less-
protected speech in the school setting. Most notably, in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court applied “public forum” analy-
sis to students’ expressive use of school property and determined that
First Amendment freedoms were diminished when students sought to
express themselves using a “curricular” vehicle, such as a class-pro-
duced newspaper, which operated primarily for teaching rather than
expressive purposes.111
The meaning of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard has
proven somewhat malleable.112 Although it is clear that substantial
disruption means something beyond hurt feelings and sharp differ-
ences of opinion, some especially deferential applications of Tinker
have reconceived the concept of “disruption” to include disturbing a
school extracurricular event113 or causing a school to consume sub-
stantial time responding to a controversy that the student pro-
vokes.114 In no event, however, should Tinker be a vehicle for
punishing even sharply worded speech about political or social issues,
or speech that merely indicates questionable judgment. Even presum-
ing that colleges have the latitude recognized under Tinker, their pu-
nitive authority extends only to speech that impedes the school from
functioning in an operational sense, not speech reflecting discredit on
the school or its students.
108. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
109. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
110. Id. at 513.
111. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269–70 (1988).
112. See Perry A. Zirkel, The Rocket’s Red Glare: The Largely Errant and Deflected
Flight of Tinker, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 594–95 (2009) (“[M]ajority opinion con-
tains threads that are susceptible to unraveling its lofty students’ rights reputa-
tion. Although the rule in Tinker generally is known as the ‘substantial
disruption’ test for student expression, a careful examination of the decision sug-
gests an elastic effect that is more akin to the Rorschach inkblot test.”).
113. See Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining
that student speech is not protected when the speech “substantially interferes”
with the school’s business).
114. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
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The Court has never squarely confronted the extent to which the
Tinker line of school-speech cases applies to claims brought by college
students, and many commentators question whether a standard cre-
ated for children attending K-12 school is suitable for adult-age college
students.115 In Hazelwood, the Court explicitly limited its holding to
the K-12 setting—where captive audiences of minors may be exposed
to speech unsuitable for their maturity—and left the door open for a
more protective standard at the college level.116
Lacking unequivocal guidance from the Supreme Court, some
lower courts have defaulted to the Tinker-Hazelwood school-speech
framework as the only tool in the toolbox.117 Even in those situations,
courts typically view content-based regulations with greater skepti-
cism at the college level in light of the maturity of the speaker and
audience, and the role of colleges as laboratories for experimentation
with ideas.118 Other courts, however, evaluate restrictions on college
students’ speech by reference to the “real-world” First Amendment
standards that apply in off-campus society. For example, campus “ci-
vility codes” commonly are evaluated—and invalidated—under the
same vagueness and overbreadth standards that would apply to con-
tent-based regulations by a city, county, or state.119
115. See, e.g., Meggen Lindsay, Comment, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School
Free-Speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—Tatro v.
University of Minnesota, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1470, 1481 (2012) (“There is a
glaring disparity in imposing the same restrictions on twenty-two-year-olds as on
twelve-year-olds.”); Karyl Roberts Martin, Demoted to High School: Are College
Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School Students?, 45
B.C. L. REV. 173, 195 (2003) (arguing that application of K-12 speech standards
to postsecondary education “could have detrimental effects on the rigor of univer-
sity education, where individual thought and free expression are particularly
valued”).
116. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (“We need not now decide whether the same de-
gree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activ-
ities at the college and university level.”).
117. See Edward L. Carter, Kevin R. Kemper & Barbara L. Morgenstern, Applying
Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157, 181 (2006) (“More than half the federal
circuits that have considered the issue have applied aspects of Hazelwood to uni-
versity- or college-student speech, despite arguments that Hazelwood’s restric-
tive standard should not be applied in the post-secondary context.”); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1801, 1828 (2017) (observing that, because Supreme Court higher-ed speech
cases “leave open some important questions about the scope of a public univer-
sity’s authority to restrict or punish the speech of its students,” lower courts have
sometimes looked to the K-12 line of cases “to provide this missing guidance”).
118. See Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum
Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activ-
ity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 502 (2005).
119. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2008) (conclud-
ing that a college’s harassment policy was unconstitutionally overbroad because
it allowed for punishment of “offensive” or “gender-motivated” comments even if
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An evolving body of caselaw at both the college and K-12 levels
addresses when school disciplinary authority extends to off-campus
speech on social media that provokes a reaction on campus. Federal
courts are coalescing around a modified Tinker-based approach, under
which speech becomes punishable when it threatens students or
school employees120 or when it is directed at the school in a way in-
tended to cause a disturbance.121 At the college level, courts have ad-
ditionally recognized some heightened degree of authority to regulate
off-campus speech over students enrolled in pre-professional programs
whose speech indicates unfitness for their chosen profession.122
Still, even at the K-12 level, courts have not equated schools’ au-
thority over speech on personal time with speech on school grounds
during the school day. In Hazelwood, the Court recognized that
schools’ authority to regulate speech diminishes outside the school set-
ting: “A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent
with its ‘basic educational mission’ even though the government could
not censor similar speech outside the school.”123 Similarly, in Morse v.
Frederick, the Court acknowledged that a sexually explicit speech that
could be grounds for disciplinary action when delivered to a school as-
sembly would be beyond the school’s jurisdiction if delivered “in a pub-
no listener felt a severe or pervasive level of harassment, and even if the com-
ments addressed “core” political or religious expression); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich.
Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1183–85 (6th Cir. 1995) (invalidating on overbreadth
grounds a university’s “discriminatory harassment” policy that defined punisha-
ble harassment as including “offensive” or “demeaning” speech, which the court
found to encompass constitutionally protected speech); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721
F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down as overbroad university’s anti-
harassment policy outlawing speech that “stigmatizes or victimizes” another per-
son because the policy swept in constitutionally protected speech).
120. See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding, in case involving discipline of student who posted messages to MySpace
threatening to emulate the Virginia Tech massacre and shoot specific people at
school, that “when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools
may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the re-
quirements of Tinker”).
121. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (holding that schools may rely on Tinker to exert punitive authority over
off-campus social media speech “when a student intentionally directs at the
school community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten,
harass, and intimidate a teacher”).
122. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012) (finding that university
could sanction student enrolled in mortuary-science program for making disre-
spectful jokes on a personal Facebook page about the cadaver she was assigned to
dissect); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying Tatro to dismiss
constitutional claims by community college student removed from nursing pro-
gram on the grounds of unprofessional speech on social media directed at
classmates).
123. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
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lic forum outside the school context.”124 Recently, the Fifth Circuit
dismissed a high-school cheerleader’s First Amendment case on the
grounds of qualified immunity, finding that the school violated no
“clearly established” legal standards in punishing her for sharing pro-
fane and sexually explicit messages on social media in violation of the
team’s code of conduct.125 But the court concluded its analysis with
the admonition that “ ‘a broad swath of off-campus student expression’
remains fully-protected by the First Amendment.”126 The off-campus,
on-campus dichotomy is relevant to evaluating colleges’ authority to
regulate athletes’ speech because colleges’ media-relations rules make
no distinction about the timing and location of the speech, asserting
the same level of control everywhere.
2. Prior Restraints in School Flunk the Constitutional Test
The Tinker line of cases applies when an educational institution
imposes individualized disciplinary sanctions for speech that threat-
ens to disrupt school operations. But prior restraints that categori-
cally restrict students from being heard are viewed with significantly
more skepticism and less deference, even at the K-12 level.
In K-12 schools, prior-restraint cases generally involve prohibi-
tions against distributing written material on school grounds during
school time. In those scenarios, student speakers almost invariably
have prevailed in facial challenges to school policies, either because
the policies are unduly broad in violation of the First Amendment or
because they leave standardless discretion in the hands of school
authorities.
Prior-restraint cases generally arise when school administrators
assert authority to review expressive materials before students can
distribute them. Most courts regard mandatory pre-approval as
facially unconstitutional because schools have narrower, less-restric-
tive means to respond to potential disruptions. For instance, in Burch
v. Barker, involving a school’s refusal to allow students to distribute
an underground newspaper, the Ninth Circuit surveyed post-Tinker
caselaw and concluded that “a policy which subjects all non-school-
sponsored communications to predistribution review for content cen-
sorship” is unconstitutional.127 The ruling relied on similar conclu-
sions from the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, each finding pre-
approval policies to be facially overbroad.128
124. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).
125. Longoria v. San Benito Indep. Sch. Dist., 942 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 2019).
126. Id. at 270 (quoting Bell, 799 F.3d at 402 (Elrod and Jones, JJ., concurring)).
127. Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988).
128. See Riseman v. Sch. Comm. of Quincy, 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971); Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th
Cir. 1975); Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Even the courts that find some pre-approval regime to be permissi-
ble have found schools’ procedural safeguards lacking. In cases involv-
ing school policies requiring permission to distribute printed
materials on school grounds, the Second and Eighth Circuits each con-
cluded that, while pre-approval was not categorically foreclosed by the
First Amendment, the schools’ policies lacked adequate constraints on
the reviewers’ discretion.129 In both cases, the courts took pains to em-
phasize that the First Amendment would tolerate some degree of pre-
approval only at the K-12 level and only when the distribution took
place on campus.130 In Bystrom v. Fridley High School, the Eighth
Circuit caveated:
The school district asserts no authority to govern or punish what students say,
write, or publish to each other or to the public at any location outside the
school buildings and grounds. If school authorities were to claim such a power,
quite different issues would be raised, and the burden of the authorities to
justify their policy under the First Amendment would be much greater, per-
haps even insurmountable. . . . Specifically, what we say in this opinion does
not apply to college or other post-secondary campuses and students. Few col-
lege students are minors, and colleges are traditionally places of virtually un-
limited free expression.131
None of these K-12 prior restraint cases, even the ones most tolerant
of administrative pre-approval, can be read as support for a college-
level restraint on speaking to the news media during all hours of the
day.
At the college level, while there is no indication that anyone has
ever challenged a prohibition against speaking with the news media,
other types of prior restraints are regularly declared unconstitutional,
most often in the context of restrictions on using campus property for
expressive activity. The breadth of the prior-restraint doctrine is best
129. See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Bystrom v.
Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit
upheld a school’s policy of pre-approving expressive materials specifically be-
cause it contained procedural safeguards—including the opportunity to appeal an
initial denial and substantive constraints on school authorities’ discretion to cen-
sor—which the court deemed to be essential prerequisites to make a pre-approval
policy constitutional. Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 43–44
(10th Cir. 2013).
130. In Eisner, 440 F.2d at 808, the Second Circuit stated that a school’s policy requir-
ing an administrator to approve literature before students disseminate it was
permissible because it did not carry any punitive consequences for disobedience
and did not extend to off-campus expression. The court added in a footnote:
Because of such factors as the larger size of university campuses, and
the tendency of students to spend a greater portion of their time there,
the inhibitive effect of a similar policy statement might be greater on the
campus of an institution of higher education than on the premises of a
secondary school and the justifications for such a policy might be less
compelling in view of the greater maturity of the students there.
See id. at 808 n.5.
131. Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 750 (citations omitted).
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illustrated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Healy v. James, which
found that even a regulation that has only a secondary effect of bur-
dening student speech can still constitute an unlawful prior restraint
if its effect is to cut off the speaker from opportunities to be heard.132
Applying prior-restraint doctrine, federal courts have routinely in-
validated restrictions that (1) require permits to use campus property
for expressive gatherings133 or to distribute literature,134 (2) empower
administrators to discretionarily reject guest speakers,135 or (3) pro-
scribe the use of offensive or hateful language.136 These restraints
typically flunk constitutional scrutiny either because they are overly
broad—burdening all speech in an attempt to weed out the subset of
speech that might realistically disrupt campus activities137—or be-
cause they fail to provide neutral and objective standards constraining
the discretion of government decision-makers.138 To be valid, permit-
ting systems that enable college authorities to decide who is allowed to
speak must have both substantive safeguards (setting boundaries that
foreclose discriminatory enforcement) as well as procedural safe-
132. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (“It is to be remembered that the effect
of the College’s denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to
petitioners’ organization the range of associational activities.”). In Healy, the de-
fendant college’s act of denying official recognition to a leftist student group was
found to burden speech because, without college recognition, the group’s mem-
bers could not use campus meeting facilities or bulletin boards. See id. at 176.
133. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v. Williams, No.
1:12-CV-155, 2012 WL 2160969 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012); Pro-Life Cougars v.
Univ. of Houston, 259 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
134. See Brubaker v. Moelchert, 405 F. Supp. 837 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
135. See, e.g., McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Univ. of Tenn.,
300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D.
Miss. 1969); Snyder v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
136. See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also Bair v. Shippensburg Univ.,
280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 369–70 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (applying Tinker and concluding
that university speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad where it required
students to communicate “in a manner that does not provoke, harass, intimidate,
or harm another” and to refrain from “acts of intolerance”).
137. See Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding cam-
pus speech code unconstitutionally broad because it proscribed speech “stigma-
tizing or victimizing” people based on membership in a protected category, which
the university interpreted to permit punishment even of harmless classroom
discussions).
138. See Pro-Life Cougars, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (finding that application process to
use campus property “lacks the procedural safeguards necessary to survive a con-
stitutional challenge” because it is “devoid of any objective guidelines or articu-
lated standards” for determining whose speech qualifies as “potentially
disruptive”); Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 973 (“The crux of a valid regulation must, in
objective language, preclude only that speech subject to being forbidden under
the doctrine of clear and present danger.”); see also Snyder, 286 F. Supp. at
934–36 (holding that regulation on speakers’ use of campus facilities was imper-
missibly vague because it enabled campus authorities to exclude speakers based
on membership in organizations deemed to be “subversive” or “un-American”).
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guards, including a reasonable time for responding to a request and a
prompt opportunity to appeal a denial.139
C. The First Amendment (Sometimes) Works at Work
Just as in public schools, the First Amendment applies in the pub-
lic workplace, and just as in public schools, courts have fashioned ex-
ceptions allowing workplace authority figures to restrict speech that
would normally be beyond the government’s regulatory reach.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized
that resolving employee-speech cases required reconciling the compet-
ing interests, including the government’s interest in the efficient de-
livery of services, employees’ interest in sharing the benefit of their
knowledge, and the electorate’s interests in honest and effective gov-
ernment that is facilitated by unimpeded access to information.140 In
Pickering, the Court sided with a schoolteacher who was fired over a
letter-to-the-editor article he wrote for the local newspaper. The letter
criticized the district’s funding priorities, remarking that school em-
ployees would have an informed perspective beneficial to the public
discourse.141
The Court applied a limiting gloss on Pickering in Connick v. My-
ers.142 In Connick, a state prosecutor aggrieved by a pending reassign-
ment decided to circulate a survey within the office soliciting feedback
about working conditions and morale.143 When her supervisor found
out she had distributed the survey, he fired her.144 The Supreme
Court concluded that the survey was primarily motivated by dissatis-
faction with workplace conditions rather than matters of genuine pub-
lic concern, and thus was entitled only to “limited” First Amendment
regard.145 As a result of Connick, “public concern” has become a re-
viewing court’s threshold inquiry before the duty to balance the par-
ties’ interests under Pickering even comes into play.
139. See Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 973 (explaining that, to make a permitting system
constitutional, the decision-maker must “act upon a request within ample time
after submission, and prompt review of his decision must be afforded”); Snyder,
286 F. Supp. at 936 (finding campus speaker regulation deficient because it pro-
vided no opportunity for appeal short of a constitutional lawsuit, making the cen-
sor’s decision effectively final).
140. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–72 (1968) (holding a teacher’s dismis-
sal for writing a letter on issues of public importance cannot be upheld and con-
cluding that limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not
significantly greater than limiting a similar contribution from the general
public).
141. Id. at 572–73.
142. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
143. Id. at 140–41.
144. Id. at 141.
145. Id. at 154.
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The Court narrowed Pickering’s scope in Garcetti v. Ceballos.146 In
Garcetti, a deputy prosecutor was disciplined for deviating from his
supervisor’s orders and writing a memo questioning the validity of a
search warrant that was essential to a case the district attorney’s of-
fice was prosecuting.147 In a 5–4 ruling, the Court found the speech to
be unprotected because it was prepared “pursuant to Ceballos’ official
duties.”148 Because the memo was in effect the government’s own
speech, not the deputy prosecutor’s speech as an individual, there was
no need to conduct a Pickering balancing of interests.149
While initially received as a grave setback for workers’ rights,150
Garcetti’s scope was significantly curtailed by the Supreme Court’s
ruling in a subsequent workplace-speech case, Lane v. Franks.151 In
Lane, a former college administrator brought a First Amendment re-
taliation claim alleging he was fired for giving incriminating testi-
mony implicating his superiors in a scheme to put a state politician on
the college payroll in a no-work sinecure. The justices held that the
speech was entitled to First Amendment protection: “Truthful testi-
mony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordi-
nary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.
That is so even when the testimony relates to his public employment
or concerns information learned during that employment.”152
The Court distinguished its holding from Garcetti, noting that
“Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply relates to public em-
ployment or concerns information learned in the course of public em-
ployment.”153 The majority framed the “critical” question as “whether
the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an em-
ployee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”154 In
other words, a public employee does not lose First Amendment protec-
tion merely by speaking about work or by sharing information learned
in the course of work; rather, for Garcetti to apply, the speech itself
must be a work assignment.155
146. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
147. Id. at 415.
148. Id. at 421.
149. Id. at 421–22.
150. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to Government’s Expressive Interests,
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2011) (decrying “deeply disturbing” prospect
that government can deprive employees of free-speech protection merely by cate-
gorizing the employee’s speech as the employer’s own).
151. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014).
152. Id. at 238.
153. Id. at 239.
154. Id. at 240.
155. See id. (“[T]he mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by
virtue of his public employment does not transform that speech into employee—
rather than citizen—speech.”).
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Once it is established that the employee’s speech falls within the
bounds of the First Amendment, prevailing on a retaliation claim then
requires proving a causal connection between the speech and some
deprivation at the hands of the employer. Early First Amendment
cases declined to recognize the loss of a government job as an actiona-
ble deprivation because employees have no vested entitlement to in-
definite employment.156 That changed with the Supreme Court’s 1967
decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, which forbade the state of
New York from insisting on an anti-Communist loyalty oath as a con-
dition of university employment.157 In Keyishian, the Court aban-
doned the distinction between the loss of an entitlement versus the
loss of a discretionary privilege, holding that any deprivation meant to
deter speech can support a retaliation claim.158
The Keyishian principle is relevant to athletes’ ability to pursue
First Amendment claims against their schools. Courts at times have
deferred to disciplinary decisions involving athletes because there is
no entitlement to participate in extracurricular activities.159 But
while the loss of a vested property interest may be necessary to sus-
tain a claim for deprivation of procedural due process,160 that is not a
prerequisite for a First Amendment case. Any punishment or depriva-
tion that is intended to chill speech and that would intimidate a
speaker of reasonable fortitude into silence is sufficient injury to sup-
port a First Amendment claim.161
While their analyses diverge, the Pickering, Connick, Garcetti, and
Lane cases share one essential trait: they involve challenges brought
156. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (observing
that a job applicant who claimed he was denied employment because of his politi-
cal views “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman”).
157. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
158. Id. at 605–06.
159. See, e.g., Johnson ex rel. S.J. v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1320
(D. Utah 2018) (concluding that school district has greater latitude to control
cheerleaders’ speech on social media because there is no constitutional entitle-
ment to participate in cheerleading and participation can be made subject to rea-
sonable restrictions); Cleveland v. Blount Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:05-CV-380, 2008
WL 250403, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008) (finding that students challenging
decision to disband cheer squad because of “suggestive” dance routines had di-
minished First Amendment rights because there is no right to participate in ex-
tracurricular activities).
160. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (finding no procedural due
process claim for the loss of an opportunity to be re-hired on a one-year teaching
contract without a hearing).
161. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500
(4th Cir. 2005) (“[F]or purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim . . . a
plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant’s allegedly retaliatory conduct
would likely deter ‘a person of ordinary firmness’ from the exercise of First
Amendment rights.” (citations omitted)).
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by individual employees disciplined by their employers for what they
said or wrote. When the case instead involves a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge to categorical prohibitions on speech restraining the entire
workforce, different legal standards will apply and the government’s
burden of justification will become nearly insurmountable. This is the
analysis that will apply if athletes facially challenge regulations
prohibiting unauthorized interactions with the press.
IV. UNTYING THE GAGS: WORKPLACE INTERVIEW BANS
STRUCK DOWN
A. Employees Undefeated in Challenging Workplace Gags
The First Amendment has consistently been interpreted to forbid
public employers from requiring employees to get supervisory ap-
proval before speaking to the news media. As far back as the 1940s,
courts were striking down mandatory gatekeeping policies as unduly
broad infringements on employees’ free-speech rights. In one of the
earliest known challenges, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated
a municipal fire department rule providing that employees needed
written approval from the chief before their names or images could
appear in a newspaper or magazine.162
After the Supreme Court created the Pickering balancing test in
1968, lower courts regularly applied the test to strike down overly
broad policies that unduly interfered with public employees’ communi-
cations with the public and press.163 For instance, the Fifth Circuit
found that a Texas sheriff’s department violated the First Amendment
by enforcing a policy that restricted employees from making “unautho-
rized public statements” and forbid comments to journalists on any
topic “that is or could be of a controversial nature.”164
The Supreme Court did not confront a prior restraint on govern-
ment employee speech until 1995, in the case of United States v. Na-
162. Kane v. Walsh, 66 N.E.2d 53, 55 (N.Y. 1946) (finding the rule “so broad in scope
and so rigid in terms as to be arbitrary and unreasonable”).
163. See Grady v. Blair, 529 F. Supp. 370, 371 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding that the Chi-
cago Fire Department’s policy prohibiting unapproved interviews with the media,
“whether on or off duty,” about matters “pertaining to Department activities” was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); Steenrod v. Board of Engineers of Fire
Dept., 87 Misc. 2d 977, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (applying Pickering and holding
that city policy that forbade firefighters from discussing “for publication, matters
concerning the department” without supervisory approval was invalid because it
could “stifl[e] what may be just criticism by a public servant concerning a matter
of public concern”); see also Hall v. Mayor of Pennsauken, 422 A.2d 797 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (holding that policy forbidding police from criticizing
superior officers was invalid because it prohibited even speech related to matters
of public concern that did not adversely affect the functioning of the department).
164. Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981).
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tional Treasury Employees Union (known as the “NTEU” case).165 In
NTEU, the Court applied rigorous scrutiny to invalidate an ethics
statute forbidding federal employees from accepting compensation for
speeches or articles. The statute was intended to deter special inter-
ests from buying influence with federal policymakers. However, the
Court found that the prohibition, which applied even to the lowest-
ranking ministerial employee, was not narrowly tailored to advance
Congress’s anti-corruption objective. Specifically, the Court stated:
“Deferring to the Government’s speculation about the pernicious ef-
fects of thousands of articles and speeches yet to be written or deliv-
ered would encroach unacceptably on the First Amendment’s
protections.”166
The justices held that a rule discouraging an entire class of em-
ployees from speaking demands an especially weighty justification,
beyond what Pickering requires to justify disciplining a single em-
ployee for speech disrupting the workplace:
[U]nlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, this ban chills
potential speech before it happens. For these reasons, the Government’s bur-
den is greater with respect to this statutory restriction on expression than
with respect to an isolated disciplinary action. The Government must show
that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and
future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are out-
weighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the
Government.167
Under the NTEU test, where the government singles out expressive
activity for regulation to address anticipated harms, the government
must “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjec-
tural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a
direct and material way.”168
Since NTEU, lower courts have consistently found mandatory-ap-
proval policies to be unlawfully broad. In an oft-cited case applying
NTEU, Harman v. City of New York, the Second Circuit found that
New York City’s health department could not lawfully require employ-
ees to refrain from answering questions from journalists and refer all
media inquiries to a public-relations officer.169 The court noted that a
categorical restraint on employee speech implicated not just the
speakers’ rights but also the public’s right to receive information
about the performance of government functions.170 Just the delay in-
herent in seeking permission, the court observed, could be tantamount
to a denial: “By delaying the review process, the employer has the
165. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
166. Id. at 475 n.21.
167. Id. at 468 (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994)).
169. Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 1998).
170. Id. at 119.
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power to destroy the immediacy of the comment on agency affairs, and
thus, in many cases, its newsworthiness.”171 The justifications prof-
fered by the city—guarding against leaks of confidential patient infor-
mation, prepping employees with adequate information before
speaking, and avoiding disclosure of information disruptive to agency
functions—were found insufficiently compelling to justify such a
broad restraint.172
Subsequently, the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all
cited Harman in striking down agency policies that require pre-clear-
ance before discussing work-related matters with the press or pub-
lic.173 Likewise, numerous district courts have followed the NTEU
and Harman rationale in finding agency prohibitions on unauthorized
interviews to be unlawfully broad, restraining more speech than is
necessary to accomplish the government’s legitimate interests.174 In a
171. Id. at 120.
172. Id. at 123–24.
173. See, e.g., Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 235–40 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding
that a police department’s policy requiring pre-approval before officers may give
expert testimony was a prior restraint and insufficiently well-tailored to accom-
plish the proffered objective of avoiding public confusion about the police depart-
ment’s official position); Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 750 (7th
Cir. 1999) (determining that police department policy prohibiting employees from
discussing the substance of formal grievance filings with any outsiders was an
indefensibly broad prior restraint); Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir.
2017) (finding state highway patrol directive that forbade employees from dis-
cussing the agency’s K-9 program with anyone outside the agency to be unconsti-
tutionally overbroad); see also Liverman v. City of St. Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400,
404–05 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying NTEU to invalidate police department’s prohibi-
tion against “negative comments” under which officers were disciplined for
Facebook posts questioning the department’s promotion policies).
174. See Lauretano v. Spada, 339 F. Supp. 2d 391, 414–15, 420 (D. Conn. 2004) (find-
ing that law enforcement agency violated employees’ rights by prohibiting officers
from making “official comments relative to department policy” to members of the
press or public without approval); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Local 3233 v. French-
town Charter Twp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736, 744 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (declaring
municipal ordinance requiring firefighters to refer all media inquiries to city fire
chief to be unconstitutionally broad); Kessler v. City of Providence, 167 F. Supp.
2d 482, 483 (D.R.I. 2001) (striking down police department’s policy that officers
“shall not talk for publication, be interviewed, make public speeches on police
business or impart information relating to the official business of the department
unless authorized by some proper authority”); Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F.
Supp. 2d 78, 89–90 (D. Mass. 2000) (striking down police department’s rule pro-
viding that only police chief or chief’s designee could release information to the
media about department matters); Providence Firefighters Local 799 v. City of
Providence, 26 F. Supp. 2d 350, 352 (D.R.I. 1998) (finding that fire chief’s order
telling employees that “only the Chief of Department has the authority to discuss
for publication, matters concerning the Department” was an unconstitutionally
broad restraint); Davis v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 742 A.2d 619, 622–23
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999) (invalidating regulation forbidding officers of a
law enforcement agency from disclosing “any information not generally available
to members of the public which such member receives or acquires in the course of
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noteworthy case in the setting of college sports, the Seventh Circuit
struck down a University of Illinois policy forbidding all faculty and
students from communicating with prospective recruits without the
athletic director’s approval, finding it to be an unjustifiably broad
prior restraint.175
In addition to being overbroad, policies restraining public employ-
ees from speaking to the media are also vulnerable to constitutional
challenges because they fail to incorporate standards to prevent deci-
sion-makers from withholding permission to speak on impermissible
grounds. Courts have repeatedly declared public employers’ pre-ap-
proval policies to be unconstitutional when they lack rigorous proce-
dural safeguards.176 In one such case involving a police department’s
rule forbidding officers from disclosing “any information concerning
the business of the department . . . unless authorized by some proper
authority,” a federal district judge found the rule infirm because it
“sets no standards to guide the decision-making process, does not re-
quire any explanation for a denial of permission to speak, and
promises no time frame for such grant or denial.”177
In short, if college athletes have First Amendment rights compara-
ble to those of public employees, there is no support for the proposition
that a government agency can enforce a categorical policy requiring
approval before speaking to the press.
B. The Dubious “Employee Status” of Athletes
Whether colleges are aware of it or not, the body of precedent that
forbids restricting public employees from speaking to the news media
and by reason of official duty” without supervisory approval, and requiring em-
ployees to treat “any matters or information” pertaining to the agency as
confidential).
175. See Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that university’s
policy restraining students and faculty from communicating with prospective
athletic recruits was an excessively broad infringement on speech not adequately
justified by its purported motivation of adhering to NCAA recruiting protocols).
176. See Swartzwelder, 297 F.3d at 240 (finding that a policy constraining Pittsburgh
police officers from providing any “opinion or advice” about any civil or criminal
matter without approval was “so open-ended that it creates a danger of improper
application”); Kessler, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 488–90 (invalidating police depart-
ment’s wide-ranging prohibition requiring approval before sharing any informa-
tion with the public as an impermissible and overly-broad prior restraint, and
also for lack of standards to limit the decision-maker’s discretion); Spain v. City
of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919, 922–23 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (declaring that fire de-
partment’s policy, which stated that officers “may not publicly communicate on
matters concerning Mansfield Fire Department rules, duties, policies, procedures
and practices without the prior written approval,” was unconstitutional because
it failed to provide “narrow, objective and definite standards” governing whether
employees would be permitted to speak (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988))).
177. Kessler, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 483, 489.
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is overwhelming. However, it is not certain that colleges have the
same level of control over football and basketball players as they have
over ordinary employees. There is little legal basis for treating ath-
letes as employees, and in fact, colleges have fought for decades to
characterize athletes as “students” rather than “employees” because
employee status would be economically disadvantageous.
Universities have widely benefited from disclaiming any employer-
employee relationship with their athletes, enabling them to avoid re-
sponsibility for paying workers’ compensation benefits when athletes
are injured on the field178 and evade claims for tortious injuries when
athletes cause harm.179 In Berger v. NCAA, the federal courts directly
confronted whether college athletes qualify as “employees” for pur-
poses of the wage-and-hour protections of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and concluded that the answer was “no.”180 The NCAA’s
attorneys argued forcefully that playing intercollegiate sports was
neither legally nor functionally the equivalent of “employment.”181
The court relied in part on authoritative guidance from the U.S. De-
partment of Labor, which has taken the position that extracurricular
activities, specifically including sports, are not “employment” for pur-
poses of FLSA enforcement because they are undertaken primarily for
the educational benefit of the individual participant.182
In the analogous context of private-college athletics, universities
have fiercely resisted classifying football players as “employees,”
which would entitle them to organize and take advantage of the other
worker-rights’ protections of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The issue came to a head when advocates for athletes’ rights
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 2014 for rec-
ognition as the bargaining representative of scholarship football play-
178. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ind. 1983)
(finding that athlete gravely injured during football scrimmage, which left him a
quadriplegic, was not an “employee” for purposes of state benefits because his
university compensation package for playing football was in the form of financial
aid and not salary).
179. See Kavanagh v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 795 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Mass. 2003) (declin-
ing to hold university accountable for injuries caused when basketball player
punched opponent during game because receipt of athletic scholarship and bene-
fits “does not transform the relationship between the academic institution and
the student into any form of employment relationship”); Korellas v. Ohio State
Univ., 2004-Ohio-3817, at *2 (concluding that a driver attacked by an Ohio State
athlete while making food delivery could not recover against university on a “neg-
ligent hiring” theory because athlete did not qualify as an employee).
180. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016).
181. See Brief for Appellees, Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-
1558), 2016 WL 3438089.
182. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, §§ 10b03(e), 10b24(a)
(2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/FOH_Ch10.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/Y9GJ-KSJR].
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ers at Northwestern University.183 The NLRA has been enforced
against private universities, including for the benefit of student em-
ployees,184 but the NLRB had never confronted whether athletes
could be regarded as “employees.”185
In deciding whether a petitioner qualifies for NLRA protection as a
statutory “employee,” the Board typically has looked to common law
agency principles, focusing on whether work is performed for an em-
ployer in exchange for compensation and whether the employer has
control over the details of how the work is performed.186 In response
to the athletes’ petition, Northwestern University forcefully argued
that the athlete-college relationship is “a far cry from the employer-
employee economic relationship” because the relationship is primarily
an academic one for the benefit of the student.187
In March 2014, the regional general counsel for the NLRB issued
an interpretation concluding that scholarship athletes in the major
revenue-producing sports at the highest level of NCAA competition
(Division I schools, including Northwestern University) met the statu-
tory prerequisites to be treated as university employees.188 Signifi-
cantly, the fact that athletic departments tightly control interaction
between athletes and the media was cited as a factor weighing in favor
of “employee” status.189
The decision stunned the college sports world.190 The NCAA and
its member universities vehemently opposed characterizing athletes
183. See Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons
Learned from Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College
Athletes’ Rights Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627, 1637–38 (2017) (describing
athletes’ petition to NLRB and university’s response).
184. The NLRB first asserted jurisdiction over private higher-education institutions
in the case of Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970), and subsequently has revis-
ited the employee status of graduate-student researchers and teaching assistants
many times over, shifting interpretations as the membership and ideology of the
Board changes. The Board’s most recent statement of the law, in Trs. of Columbia
Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016), finds that student
research assistants are employees with NLRA-protected bargaining rights, over-
turning its previous interpretation in Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
185. See Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1352 (2015) (“[T]his case involves novel and
unique circumstances. The Board has never before been asked to assert jurisdic-
tion in a case involving college football players, or college athletes of any kind.”).
186. See id. at 1362–63 (explaining application of common law agency test).
187. Edelman, supra note 183, at 1637.
188. Nw. Univ., Case No. 13-RC-151359 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), https://
www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359 [https://perma.unl.edu/3YWC-3MU8] (Decision
and Direction of Election).
189. See Edelman, supra note 183, at 1638–39 (citing Region 13 counsel’s observation
that “Northwestern University coaches also determined whether the football
players could seek outside employment, if the players were allowed to speak with
the media, and what content the players could post on the Internet”).
190. See Ned Resnikoff, Northwestern University Fights Back Against NCAA Football
Unionization, MSNBC (Apr. 9, 2014, 3:47 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/col-
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as employees, pointing to all of the ways the athlete-university rela-
tionship is unlike standard employment.191 Turning student-athletes
into employees, the NCAA insisted, “undermines the purpose of col-
lege: an education.”192
On appeal, the NLRB decided not to make a decision. The Board
invoked its discretion to decline jurisdiction in cases where federal in-
tervention would not advance the worker-rights objectives of the
Act.193 The Board expressed concern that a decision in favor of the
Northwestern athletes could destabilize competition by producing two
unequal sets of rules, one for private universities under NLRB juris-
diction and another for public universities.194
The NLRB’s scrutiny of Northwestern football unexpectedly pro-
duced some guidance favorable to athletes at private institutions, di-
rectly addressing their right to speak freely to the news media. The
Board has long interpreted the NLRA to prohibit private-sector em-
ployers from enforcing blanket prohibitions on employee speech to the
press and public.195 The Board regards taking workplace concerns to
an external audience to be a step in the “organizing” process that the
lege-fights-ncaa-unionization [https://perma.unl.edu/SHV5-JGY9] (terming
NLRB’s interpretation “a considerable upset for both Northwestern University
and the NCAA” that, if upheld, “could have reverberations throughout the entire
NCAA”).
191. See Dan Wolken, NCAA President Mark Emmert Decries College Union Effort,
USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2014, 1:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/col-
lege/2014/04/06/mark-emmert-ncaa-structure-presidents-press-conference-union-
ization-labor/7382025/ [https://perma.unl.edu/UD55-DSQW] (quoting NCAA
president’s remarks at press conference that unionization would be “grossly inap-
propriate” and “would blow up everything about the collegiate model of
athletics”).
192. See Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-
wildcats-football-players-trying-join-labor-union [https://perma.unl.edu/QVM2-
AJQR] (quoting statement from NCAA Chief Legal Officer, Donald Remy, in re-
sponse to Northwestern decision).
193. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015).
194. See id. at 1352 (“[I]t would not promote stability in labor relations to assert juris-
diction in this case.”).
195. See Pleasant Travel Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 3982203 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 28, 2010)
(finding that resort hotel violated employees’ rights by enforcing regulation stat-
ing: “At no time should any employee, manager, or director of the Resort engage
in communication either verbally or in writing, with a member of the news me-
dia, without prior approval and direction from either the Human Resources Di-
rector or the General Manager.”); Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 N.L.R.B. 382, 385–86
(2008) (finding that an employer’s policy forbidding unauthorized employees from
speaking with the media about any incident “that generates significant public
interest or press inquiries” was unlawfully broad), abrogated on other grounds by
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010).
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NLRA was enacted to protect.196 But until recent years, the Board
had never been asked to apply that line of precedent to college sports.
In August 2015, a labor-rights lawyer filed a complaint with the
NLRB alleging that Northwestern’s restrictions on the speech of foot-
ball players violated the NLRA. While the complaint was pending,
Northwestern substantially rewrote its handbook to relax restrictive
policies on athletes’ speech.197 The Board’s associate general counsel
responded to the complaint in a September 2016 Advice Memorandum
taking note of the substantial revisions and identifying regulations re-
moved from the handbook that would have been regarded as unfair
labor practices.198 Practices identified as unlawful included prohibit-
ing interviews with the press without approval from a public relations
officer, and directing students and employees to say only positive
things to the media and avoid negative comments.199 As one commen-
tator explained, excessive gatekeeping over athletes’ communications
with the media violates federal labor law at NLRB-regulated universi-
ties because it gives the university veto power over speech “for the
mutual aid and protection of the student-athlete and his teammates,”
such as exposing unsafe practice conditions.200 Because Northwestern
largely rewrote its past unlawful policies (for instance, by making con-
sultation with a sports-information officer an optional service and not
196. See, e.g., Phillips 66, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 921, *58 (Nov. 25, 2014) (finding that oil
refinery violated the NLRA by enforcing overly restrictive policy stating that, if
employees were contacted by the media, “no information exchange is permitted
concerning [company] operations” and that it was “against company policy for
anyone but an authorized company spokespersons [sic] to speak to the news me-
dia”), rev’d on other grounds, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (Jan. 31, 2020); Portola Packag-
ing, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 1316 (2012) (ordering employer to rescind unlawful
provisions in employee handbook stating that employees “should not provide any
information regarding the Company to the media” and that the release of any
documents to the media must be approved by the company’s chief financial of-
ficer), rev’d on other grounds, 361 N.L.R.B. 1316 (2014).
197. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., to Peter Sung Ohr, Reg’l Dir. of Region 13 (Sept. 22, 2016) [herein-
after Advice Memo].
198. Id.; see also Lester Munson, Free to Tweet: Northwestern’s Restrictions on Foot-
ball Players Ruled Unlawful, ESPN (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.espn.com/espn/
otl/story/_/id/17765516/nlrb-rules-northwestern-restrictions-unlawful [https://
perma.unl.edu/33LQ-QH4L] (reporting the NLRB’s decision in regards to North-
western’s unlawful restrictions).
199. Advice Memo, supra note 197, at 5.
200. See Roger M. Groves, Memorandum from Student-Athletes to Schools: My Social
Media Posts Regarding My Coaches or My Causes Are Protected Speech—How the
NLRB Is Restructuring Rights of Student-Athletes in Private Institutions, 78 LA.
L. REV. 69, 120 (2017) (“[I]f a student-athlete at a private school chose to speak to
the media directly about working conditions, practice times, coach interruptions
of classes, dangerous practice conditions, or failure to follow concussion protocol,
for example, [the NLRA] protects the student-athlete’s right to do so.”).
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mandatory), the regional NLRB counsel recommended taking no puni-
tive action and closing the case.201
In sum, it would be quite difficult for university administrators to
take the position, after decades of arguing otherwise, that they can
control athletes’ speech because athletes are the legal equivalent of
employees. But even if a court were to find such equivalency, policies
restricting employees from having unapproved conversations about
their work—whether in the public or private sector—have long been
regarded as unlawful. Hence, if university lawyers seek to justify en-
forcing a media-gatekeeping policy that requires approval before dis-
cussing “work-related” matters with the media, they will have to look
outside the employment sector for their rationale.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NETHERWORLD OF SPORTS
Schools’ and colleges’ interests in enforcing conformity and pre-
serving a favorable public image have always created friction with
athletes’ interests in freedom of expression. Even so, student-athletes
have prevailed on First Amendment claims where courts recognized
their speech as societally valuable and where the speech did not cross
the line into defiant behavior.
In the context of sports, courts afford some degree of heightened
deference to school and college authorities, allowing them to punish
speech even if the only disruption is to harmony within the locker
room. The most prominent defeat for athletes came in the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s Lowery v. Euverard, involving a high school football team’s re-
volt against a coach many players found unbearable to play for.202 In
Lowery, students at a Tennessee high school circulated a petition
seeking the removal of their head football coach, alleging that he used
degrading and humiliating tactics and violated state regulations with
an overly demanding conditioning program.203 When the coach tried
to question players about the petition, four of them walked out of the
interrogation and were removed from the team.
The Sixth Circuit found no constitutional violation, emphasizing
the importance of obedience to authority in the setting of scholastic
sports where individuals must sacrifice some individual freedom for
the collective goal of winning games.204 Analogizing the football field
to the workplace, the court emphasized that students voluntarily sur-
render some autonomy as part of the bargain when they join the
team.205
201. Advice Memo, supra note 197, at 5.
202. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007).
203. Id. at 585.
204. Id. at 594–96.
205. Id. at 596–97. A concurring judge agreed that damages were unwarranted, but
broke with the majority’s reasoning that athletes have fewer free-speech protec-
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As in Lowery, courts have readily deferred to schools’ punishment
of athletes and cheerleaders where the students’ speech was regarded
as primarily a personal gripe about the coach206 or was otherwise of
minimal societal value.207 Several of the cases have overtly recognized
diminished constitutional protection in the context of competitive
sports, noting that participation is voluntary and is not a core part of
schools’ educational offerings.208
Athletes’ claims have fared far better when the speech takes the
form of peaceful political protest or whistleblowing about improprie-
ties within their own institutions. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
sided with high school athletes who challenged punishment imposed
for speaking out against abusive coaching techniques.209 In a rare col-
tions than rank-and-file students: “[A] student-athlete does not, as suggested by
the lead opinion, enjoy fewer First Amendment rights under Tinker because of
his or her choice to participate in high school athletics.” Id. at 605 (Gilman, J.,
concurring).
206. See Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 769–70
(8th Cir. 2001) (finding no First Amendment violation when an Iowa high school
disciplined a basketball player for distributing a letter to her teammates that
used profanity to criticize their coach and stir up dissension against him; the
letter was primarily motivated by the player’s grudge over being passed over for
the varsity squad); Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 733–34 (10th Cir. 1981) (dis-
missing First Amendment claims of college basketball players who lost their ath-
letic scholarships after criticizing their head coach, both privately and in the
news media, on the grounds that their complaints about perceived favoritism by
the coaching staff were “not of general public concern” and “resulted in dishar-
mony among the players and disrupted the effective administration of the basket-
ball program”).
207. See Johnson ex rel. S.J. v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1320 (D.
Utah 2018) (applying Lowery and dismissing First Amendment claims by high
school cheerleader removed from squad for profane speech on social media, find-
ing that there is no entitlement to participate in cheerleading so participation can
be subjected to conditions beyond those that could be enforced against rank-and-
file students); Green v. Sandy, No. 5:10-CV-367-JMH, 2011 WL 4688639 (E.D.
Ky. Oct. 3, 2011) (extending Lowery reasoning to the college level and finding no
constitutional violation when a college soccer player was removed from the team
after she and her father each wrote letters to the college administration com-
plaining about how coaches treated her); Cleveland v. Blount Cty. Sch. Dist., No.
3:05-CV-380, 2008 WL 250403, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008) (applying Lowery
to dismiss First Amendment claims by members of cheerleading team whose rou-
tines were censored as inappropriately sexually provocative for a young
audience).
208. See Stokey v. N. Canton Sch. Dist., No. 5:18-CV-1011, 2018 WL 2234953, at *5
(N.D. Ohio May 15, 2018) (citing Lowery and finding that athletes have dimin-
ished free-speech protection because there is no constitutional entitlement to
take part in extracurricular sports).
209. See Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 760 n.5, 763–64 (9th Cir.
2006) (applying Tinker and finding that high school basketball players committed
no punishable disruption by circulating a petition seeking the removal of their
coach for “incessant yelling, profanity and abusive coaching tactics”); Seamons v.
Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) (ruling in favor of high school football player
who was removed from the team after his coach demanded that he apologize for
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lege-athlete whistleblowing case, a federal court in Kansas found in
favor of college football players who boycotted a practice after com-
plaining that black players were shortchanged on their athletic schol-
arships and getting no redress from their university.210
Overall, the takeaway from these cases is that the same First
Amendment standards apply to athletes as to all other students, al-
though close judgment calls will likely go in favor of school authorities
in the athletic context because disobedient behavior is regarded as in-
herently more disruptive in a team sport.211 Since none of the prior
cases in the college or high-school sports context involved a categorical
prior restraint, their usefulness in gauging the constitutionality of a
media gatekeeping policy is limited.
One additional consideration that may weigh into assessing the le-
gality of colleges’ restrictive media policies is the parallel body of re-
strictions that colleges increasingly enforce on their athletes’ personal
use of social media. It is now commonplace for coaches or athletic de-
partments to ban athletes from using particular social media plat-
forms, or even all forms of social media.212 The constitutionality of
social media prohibitions has yet to be tested, and there is wide con-
sensus in the legal field that the prohibitions are untenably broad.213
reporting several teammates for beating him up in the locker room); see also Gon-
zalez ex rel. A.G. v. Burley High Sch., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (D. Idaho 2019) (find-
ing that sit-in by cheerleaders protesting coach’s bullying and disregard for safety
was protected speech and that even the loss of extracurricular participation was
an actionably serious deprivation); Boyd v. Bd. of Dirs. of McGehee Sch. Dist. No.
17, 612 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (finding that the First Amendment protected
high school football players who walked out of a pep rally and refused to play in
that evening’s game in protest of the school’s decision to deny the “homecoming
queen” distinction to a black student who won the most votes).
210. Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Kan. 1987).
211. In a thorough examination of athlete-speech cases, commentator Noel Johnson
concluded that courts have drawn a line between unsuccessful challenges to the
exercise of discretionary decision-making authority, which coaches must exercise
to manage a team effectively, versus successful challenges to the exercise of “au-
thority that the coach should not necessarily have,” i.e., to treat players in a dis-
criminatory or abusive manner. See Noel Johnson, Tinker Takes the Field: Do
Student Athletes Shed Their Constitutional Rights at the Locker Room Gate?, 21
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 293, 311 (2010).
212. See Tehrim Umar, Total Eclipse of the Tweet: How Social Media Restrictions on
Student and Professional Athletes Affect Free Speech, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 311, 331 (2015) (identifying major athletic programs where athletes
are banned from using all social media or certain forbidden social applications).
213. See. e.g., id. at 343 (concluding that athletic departments’ bans on using some or
all social media platforms are unlikely to survive First Amendment challenge
because they are not narrowly tailored and do not represent the least restrictive
means of achieving the universities’ legitimate objectives); Marcus Hauer, The
Constitutionality of Public University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech Through
Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413, 422 (2012) (finding that broad prohibitions on
college athletes’ social media use will not survive analysis under Tinker because
it is insufficient to show that an entire medium has the potential to produce some
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Nevertheless, the fact that athletes may not be free to express con-
cerns about their athletic programs—or about broader social or politi-
cal issues—on Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram is a factor weighing
against enforcement of prohibitions on interviewing. If athletes can
neither speak to journalists without supervisory consent, nor use the
alternative platform of social media, then an athlete has no unfiltered
opportunity to share a message or exchange ideas with a public audi-
ence. The First Amendment disfavors restrictions on speech that cut
the speaker off from all means of reaching the desired audience.214
Educational institutions may be convinced that they have a free
hand to regulate their students’ speech because, in contexts other
than the First Amendment, courts have rebuffed constitutional claims
by athletes premised on Due Process or the Fourth Amendment.215
For instance, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme
Court rejected constitutional claims brought on behalf of student-ath-
letes challenging their Oregon school district’s decision to require a
signed waiver acceding to random drug testing as a condition of play-
ing competitive sports.216 While recognizing that drug tests are con-
sidered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Supreme Court
ruled that the drug-testing regime imposed no unreasonable intrusion
on the students’ privacy.217 The Court observed that student-athletes
already accept diminished privacy, including communal showering
and locker facilities, by “going out for the team,” and therefore, the
intrusion of filling a urine cup in the privacy of a restroom is a rather
minimal additional intrusion.218 On the opposing side of the scale, the
Court found two governmental interests that outweighed the sacrifice
of students’ privacy. First, drug use presented an imminent physical
disruptive speech); Frank D. LoMonte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Col-
leges Can’t, and Shouldn’t, Control Student Athletes’ Speech on Social Media, 9 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 48 (2014) (concluding that prohibitions on social media use are
likely to be found unconstitutionally overbroad if challenged).
214. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 373 (3d Cir. 2008) (“An alternative
is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the intended audience.”
(quoting Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.
1990))).
215. When students challenge the loss of opportunities to play sports based on any-
thing other than a violation of First Amendment free-speech rights, courts com-
monly reject their challenges on the grounds that there is no vested right to
participate in extracurricular activities that entitle a student to any particular
pre-deprivation process. See, e.g., Colo. Seminary (Univ. of Denver) v. NCCA, 570
F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1978) (interest of student athlete in participating in in-
tercollegiate sports did not rise to level of constitutionally protected right invok-
ing due process); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 366 (D. Ariz. 1983)
(participation in intercollegiate athletics is not a constitutionally protected
interest).
216. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651 (1995).
217. Id. at 665.
218. Id. at 657.
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danger to safety, including the safety of innocent teammates and op-
ponents; and second, the evidence established a crisis level of defiance
of drug laws and other illicit behavior in this particular district, which
in the school’s judgment could be ameliorated by curbing drug use
among student role models.219 Because of this especially compelling
factual predicate—the government was responding to a documented
problem that is both illegal and physically dangerous—the Vernonia
case cannot be interpreted as a green light for colleges to treat sports
as a Constitution-free zone.
VI. MEDIA GAG POLICIES AND ATHLETES’ RIGHTS
Because athletic departments’ prohibitions on unapproved inter-
views are prior restraints220 and lack any limiting standards or proce-
dures, they are unenforceable if athletes have either the “employee”
level of constitutional protection221 or the “student” level.222 The
prohibitions in force at universities across the country are even
broader than those regularly found to be unconstitutional when ap-
plied to students or to public employees because the policies are un-
limited in scope (applying even to off-hours expression) and subject
matter (applying regardless of whether the athlete’s planned speech
relates to athletic “duties” or relates purely to personal interests).223
219. Id. at 661–63.
220. See McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A prior restraint is any
law ‘forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that
such communications are to occur.’” (quoting Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 550 (1993))).
221. At least four circuits (the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth) have struck down poli-
cies forbidding public employees from granting unauthorized interviews as
facially overbroad, and no circuit has taken a contrary position. UNIV. OF FLA.,
BRECHNER CTR FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, PROTECTING SOURCES AND
WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO
SPEAK TO THE MEDIA 7 (2019), http://brechner.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
Public-employee-gag-orders-Brechner-issue-brief-as-published-10-7-19.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/3Q7B-8VQJ].
222. As the Sixth Circuit stated in McGlone—striking down a Tennessee university’s
rule requiring outside speakers to apply for permission at least fourteen days in
advance before speaking on campus property— even the existence of an advance-
notice requirement itself chills speech: “Any notice period is a substantial inhibi-
tion on speech. The simple knowledge that one must inform the government of
his desire to speak and must fill out appropriate forms and comply with the appli-
cable regulations discourages citizens from speaking freely.” See McGlone, 681
F.3d at 733–34 (citations omitted) (first quoting Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 2005); and then quoting
NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984)).
223. In concluding that athletic department gatekeeping policies do not offend the
First Amendment, the University of Oregon’s Reed Report, supra note 62, funda-
mentally erred in drawing on caselaw that applies to journalists’ right of access to
government premises. When a journalist seeks access to a person and not a place,
courts analyze the right of access under traditional First Amendment principles
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In none of the fifty mandatory gatekeeping policies obtained from
universities did college athletic departments set forth any factors by
which a request to talk to the media would be reviewed, or any stan-
dards that would constrain the athletic department’s discretion to
deny permission in a capricious, retaliatory, or viewpoint-discrimina-
tory way. In none of the policies did athletic departments impose any
deadline for deciding whether to approve an interview or provide any
route by which an athlete denied permission to speak to the media
could appeal. In short, the policies in place at athletic departments
across the country include none of the procedural safeguards that
courts have found essential to make prior restraints on speech
constitutional.224
With this in mind, athletic departments will be forced to argue that
the athlete-university relationship is so unique that athletes have
rights inferior to those of employees or rank-and-file students. In Ore-
gon’s 2017 Reed Report, the university cited two primary justifications
for filtering interview requests through the Sports Information office.
The first was “time management” to keep popular athletes from being
“deluged” with requests, and the second was “vetting” so “student ath-
letes know who they are talking to.”225 These types of justifications
are unlikely to overcome the strong presumption against prior re-
that apply to speaker-to-listener communications. The closer analog is not the
Press-Enterprise standard that applies when judges consider closing judicial pro-
ceedings to the public, but the standard that applies when judges deny journal-
ists access to interviews with trial participants. In that context, courts widely
agree that a gag order forbidding parties, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors from
speaking to the press is properly analyzed as a prior restraint and is unconstitu-
tional unless narrowly tailored. See Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233,
1236 (10th Cir. 1986) (“A court may impose a prior restraint on the gathering of
news about one of its trials only if the restraint is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest. Moreover, the court must narrowly tailor any prior re-
straint and must consider any reasonable alternatives to that restraint which
have a lesser impact on [F]irst [A]mendment rights.” (citations omitted)); CBS,
Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that, although trial
judge’s gag order did not directly restrain journalists from publishing, it had the
same practical effect because “it is apparent that significant and meaningful
sources of information concerning the case are effectively removed from them and
their representatives”). On no occasion have courts reviewed the ability to inter-
view trial participants under the Press-Enterprise doctrine, which is unsuited to
the context of interviews with individuals because it relies on “whether the place
and process have historically been open to the press and general public.” Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
224. See Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes: Under Current Jurisprudence, What
Permits Are Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 425 (2008) (“[A]uthoritative prece-
dent supports the view that permit schemes should be limited in scope in all as-
pects and that any legitimate interest the government has pertains to public
expression of such magnitude and attendance that, for the purposes of public
safety and order, government regulation is deemed absolutely necessary.”).
225. REED REPORT, supra note 62, at 9.
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straints, both because athletic department policies are so broad (ap-
plying even to little-publicized sports where no “deluge” of interviews
is foreseeable) and because narrower and less speech-restrictive alter-
natives exist (for instance, making public-relations services volunta-
rily available to players who request help preparing for interviews or
managing their time).
If a college’s media gatekeeping policy were challenged, the college
would likely argue that voluntary participation in athletics waives, ei-
ther by written agreement or by implication, some constitutional liber-
ties in exchange for the “privilege” of playing.226 The waiver-by-
contract argument, however, is problematic both legally and factually.
First Amendment rights are not easily waived. The Supreme Court
has held that courts must “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.”227 An agree-
ment will not be interpreted to waive constitutional rights unless
there is clear and compelling evidence of a “voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent” waiver.228 A court construing waiver language will look to
such factors as whether “the parties to the contract have bargaining
equality and have negotiated the terms of the contract” and whether
“the waiving party is advised by competent counsel and has engaged
in other contract negotiations.”229 This only makes sense. If First
226. The Supreme Court has recognized that participating in extracurricular activi-
ties, particularly sports, comes with some accompanying waiver of privacy rights.
See supra note 216 and accompanying text; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651 (1995) (rejecting high school athletes’ Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to mandatory drug testing because school demonstrated that
safety concerns outweighed athletes’ privacy rights, which diminish in the locker-
room setting). But these were exceptional facts, accompanied by proof that less-
intrusive alternatives had been tried and failed. See Hauer, supra note 213, at
424–25 (explaining that Vernonia was heavily influenced by severity of drug
problem and ineffectiveness of solutions short of randomized drug testing). These
same considerations will not come into play when evaluating the constitutional-
ity of a college’s media gatekeeping policy. It does not follow from these Fourth
Amendment cases in the K-12 context that courts will recognize a generalized
waiver of constitutional rights on the part of college athletes.
227. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
228. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 205 (3d Cir.
2012); see also Klein v. Livingston Cty., No. 10-CV-12361, 2011 WL 13217080, at
*4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2011) (“Courts have held that validly-executed releases
may waive federal statutory rights and constitutional rights only where the
agreement was entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and with-
out coercion, overreaching, or exploitation.”).
229. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 205 (quoting Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 853
F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Patrick Stubblefield, Evading the Tweet
Bomb: Utilizing Financial Aid Agreements to Avoid First Amendment Litigation
and NCAA Sanctions, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 599 (2012) (making the point that if
colleges want immunity from claims arising out of supervising their athletes’ use
of social media, the terms will have to be spelled out unambiguously in the finan-
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Amendment rights could be surrendered by a throwaway boilerplate
line in a handbook, public employers everywhere could evade the Pick-
ering and NTEU body of safeguards by simply insisting on waivers as
a condition of employment.230
There is no bargaining equality and no freedom to negotiate in col-
lege sports, and certainly no reason to believe that a college would
entertain a “counteroffer” by an athlete who insisted on being allowed
to speak freely with the media as a condition of signing with a particu-
lar athletic program. The NCAA standardizes the terms of the rela-
tionship, leaving no ability for individualized bargaining.231 The
NCAA caps the number of years of playing eligibility,232 limits mobil-
ity to transfer between schools,233 and limits the range of permissible
compensation regardless of whether the athlete is a standout per-
former or a bench-warmer.234 As one commentator has observed,
“[U]niversities, through the voluntary association known as the
NCAA, collectively and unilaterally define the university-athlete rela-
tionship on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.”235
cial aid agreement because courts will not assume that a party has agreed to
waive constitutional rights).
230. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (“[A] State cannot condition pub-
lic employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected
interest in freedom of expression.”); see also Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136
F.3d 1055, 1063 n.3 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Connick and finding that any claimed
waiver of constitutionally protected privacy rights in exchange for employment as
a law enforcement officer would be unenforceable and would not deprive officers
of the right to challenge disclosure of confidential information about them).
231. In a 1984 ruling enjoining the NCAA from penalizing college athletic programs
that negotiated broadcast agreements separate from the NCAA’s global agree-
ment, the Supreme Court described the NCAA as a “classic cartel with an almost
absolute control over the supply of college football which is made available to the
networks, to television advertisers, and ultimately to the viewing public.” NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 96 (1984) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F.
Supp. 1276, 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 1982)).
232. See Zak Brown, Note, What’s Said in This Locker Room, Stays in This Locker
Room: Restricting the Social Media Use of Collegiate Athletes and the Implica-
tions for Their Institutions, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 421, 431 (2012)
(discussing NCAA bylaw that limits years of eligibility).
233. See, e.g., David Whitley, Players Are Held Hostage by NCAA, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Jan. 1, 2009), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2009-01-01-
whitley01-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/N77Z-89H3] (reporting that Univer-
sity of Miami football coaches blocked former player Robert Marve from transfer-
ring to several schools, including all schools in the Atlantic Coast Conference and
Southeastern Conference, as well as all other schools in Florida).
234. See David A. Grenardo, The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confes-
sions of a Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor, 95 OR. L. REV. 223, 266
(2016) (“[T]he NCAA and member institutions’ capping the compensation for all
college athletes at the grant-in-aid level, or the full cost of attendance, results in
a significant anticompetitive effect.”).
235. Richard T. Karcher, Big-Time College Athletes’ Status as Employees, 33 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 31, 32 (2017).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has signaled disfavor for contracts
that purport to impose broad waivers of First Amendment rights as a
condition for receiving a government benefit. In a 2013 case involving
conditions imposed on federal AIDS education grants, the Court held
that applicants for the grant could not be forced to accept a broad sur-
render of First Amendment rights (in that case, the right to express
dissent from the U.S. government’s official position of condemning
prostitution).236
Under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, a government
agency may not coerce the recipient of a government benefit to waive
fundamental constitutional rights, even if the benefit is entirely dis-
cretionary.237 A requirement to forfeit fundamental rights as a condi-
tion of receiving a government benefit will be held unconstitutional if
the right being surrendered “has little or no relationship” to the bene-
fit.238 Requiring the applicant to sign a waiver does not validate an
otherwise unconstitutional condition because “the state cannot accom-
plish indirectly that which it has been constitutionally prohibited from
doing directly.”239
Colleges’ media gatekeeping policies are not limited to the scope of
the activity (participation in sports) because they make no allowance
for speaking to journalists about matters other than sports. Nor are
they limited to times of the year when the athletes’ sports are in sea-
son, when the risk of distraction might legitimize some compromise of
free-speech rights. If challenged under the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions, it is unlikely that a wholesale prohibition on unap-
proved interaction with the news media as a condition of receiving an
athletic scholarship could be sustained.
Perhaps most significantly, not all athletes receive the package of
compensation afforded to scholarship players. According to NCAA
236. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
237. Richard Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1988); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989)
(“[G]overnment may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary sur-
render a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit
altogether.”).
238. Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1217 (11th Cir.
2013) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)). In Lebron, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that requiring welfare recipients to submit to drug screen-
ing as a condition for benefits under the federally-funded Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families program violated the Constitution. Id. at 1217–18. See also
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (holding
that a Jehovah’s Witness could not be denied unemployment benefits on the
grounds of his refusal to forsake his religious objections to work in a weapons
factory because, “a person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of
a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public
program”).
239. Lebron, 710 F.3d at 1217.
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figures, about 46% of all athletes in the most competitive division, Di-
vision I, are non-scholarship “walk-on” players.240 They sign no letter
of intent committing them to enroll, and they receive no compensation
beyond the intangible benefits of athletic participation.241 None of the
gatekeeping policies obtained from college athletic departments stated
that walk-on players were free to grant requests for interviews. Self-
evidently, athletic departments do not regard their ability to control
the speech of athletes to be a product of the scholarship agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Colleges have extraordinary control over the lives of student-ath-
letes.242 An athlete whose scholarship is revoked loses not just a po-
tentially irreplaceable shot at a free college education, but also meals,
medical care, and a place to live. It is little wonder, then, that college
athletes hesitate to step over the good-conduct lines drawn by their
coaches and athletic departments, even when those lines might not be
constitutionally permissible.
Manifestly, athletic departments’ gatekeeping policies are bad for
journalism. Sports journalists at times have literally been forced to
write articles about star athletic performers with no quotes from the
240. Joe Leccesi, The 5 Most Commonly Asked Questions About Being a College Walk-
On, USA TODAY HIGH SCH. SPORTS (Apr. 13, 2017), https://usatodayhss.com/2017/
the-5-most-commonly-asked-questions-about-being-a-college-walk-on [https://
perma.unl.edu/N3XQ-L54C].
241. See Otis B. Grant, African American College Football Players and the Dilemma of
Exploitation, Racism and Education: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Sports Law,
24 WHITTIER L. REV. 645, 653, 659 n.96 (2003); see also Aaron Sorenson, Walking
On 101, NCSA, http://www.ncsasports.org/blog/2012/10/25/walking-101/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/9ZVL-WNGX] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (explaining that walk-on
athletes cannot sign letters of intent and “oftentimes will not receive the same
attention and privileges as [their] teammates”). In a case involving the “em-
ployee” status of Northwestern University football players, the National Labor
Relations Board’s regional counsel took note of the legally significant differences
between being a walk-on player versus being a scholarship player, including the
absence of a contractually binding relationship. Nw. Univ., Case No. 13-RC-
151359 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359
[https://perma.unl.edu/UXY9-VLWW] (Decision and Direction of Election). Be-
cause of that distinction, the regional counsel (in a decision later vacated by the
NLRB) concluded that walk-on football players did not qualify as statutory em-
ployees while scholarship players did. See id. at 17.
242. See Meg Penrose, Tinkering with Success: College Athletes, Social Media and the
First Amendment, 35 PACE L. REV. 30, 43 (2014) (“[c]ollege athletes are generally
the most regulated students on campus,” including restrictions on their social
lives, minimum grades, mandatory tutoring sessions, and even holiday travel);
Whitney D. Hermandorfer, Note, Blown Coverage: Tackling the Law’s Failure to
Protect Athlete-Whistleblowers, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 250, 250 (2015)
(describing vulnerability of whistleblowers whose coaches “have absolute discre-
tion to refuse to renew their scholarships”).
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athletes because coaches will not grant permission for interviews.243
But the stakes are higher than that. When athletes feel that their con-
tinued receipt of a college education (to say nothing of future profes-
sional prospects) is at risk if they are caught taking their complaints
to the media, whistle-blowing is silenced.
As wave after wave of buried scandal comes to light, the lack of
meaningful oversight over college sports becomes more apparent.244
The role of internal whistleblowers is widely recognized as providing a
salutary check on the abuse of authority in both the public and private
sectors.245 But employees in college athletic departments face consid-
erable pressure to stay silent even when they witness abusive behav-
ior, both because of an organizational culture that rewards loyalty and
discourages boat-rocking, as well as because of external pressures, in-
cluding the risk of backlash from devoted sports fans.246 One survey of
college athletic department whistleblowers found that all thirteen in-
terviewees experienced some form of retaliation—one reported discov-
ering her phone had been bugged by the university’s counsel and
another received death threats—and most of those who complained
internally to supervisors felt that their complaints went ignored.247
Because the incentives for employees tilt so profoundly toward silence,
243. See, e.g., Mark Cooper, Small-Town OSU Freshman James Washington is Mak-
ing a Big Impression, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.tulsaworld.com/
sports/college/osu/small-town-osu-freshman-james-washington-is-making-abig/
article_effcd3e2-083c-5868-b57c-fe4b8122eea2.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
9ZFD-N6YQ] (chronicling exploits of high-achieving Oklahoma State University
football star who, because of athletic department policies, was not allowed to give
an interview); Ross Dellenger, LSU’s Derrius Guice Runs for Murdered Father,
Hard-Working Mom, Hard-Driving Coaches, ADVOCATE (Oct. 19, 2015, 8:22 AM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_9b871504-3179-
5cd7-80f8-a8a4aeb2ea96.html [https://perma.unl.edu/Y8W6-XK9C] (profiling a
prodigious Louisiana State University recruit without quotes from him because
LSU does not allow freshmen to speak with the media).
244. In a recent multi-part series, USA Today reported that college athletes are expo-
nentially more likely than their non-athlete classmates to face charges of sexual
assault, yet secrecy in the college disciplinary system enables even those accused
in multiple acts of serious wrongdoing to simply transfer schools with no adverse
consequences and no public awareness. Kenny Jacoby, Predator Pipline: NCAA
Looks the Other Way as Athletes Punished for Sex Offenses Play On, USA TODAY
(Dec. 12, 2019), https://gatehousenews.com/predatorpipeline [https://
perma.unl.edu/84UL-3FZG].
245. See Edmund Donnelly, Comment, What Happens When Student-Athletes Are the
Ones Who Blow the Whistle?: How Lowery v. Euverard Exposes a Deficiency in the
First Amendment Rights of Student-Athletes, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 943, 959
(2009) (describing federal and state statutory protections for whistleblowers who
report wrongdoing to regulators).
246. Chris Hanna, Jeffrey Levine & Anita M. Moorman, College Athletics Whistle-
Blower Protection, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 209, 212, 218 (2017).
247. Brian K. Richardson & Joseph McGlynn, Blowing the Whistle off the Field of
Play: An Empirical Model of Whistle-Blower Experiences in the Intercollegiate
Sport Industry, 3 COMM. & SPORT 57, 70–71 (2014).
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it is especially important that students feel safe in exposing dangerous
or illicit behavior within their athletic programs.
Any system that requires a speaker to obtain advance permission
from a government official will be viewed with deep and well-founded
skepticism. This skepticism applies even in the settings of the campus
and the workplace, where other First Amendment safeguards dimin-
ish. None of the justifications commonly offered by college athletic de-
partments—most of which are image-motivated248 and based on a
paternalistic notion of “saving” athletes from reputational harm from
their own mistakes—are sufficiently compelling justifications to over-
ride the presumption against prior restraints. It is possible to craft a
constitutionally sound policy that is narrowly tailored to address the
government’s legitimate interests. For instance, at the University of
Texas-Austin, athletes are told not to use social media to post photos
or videos taken in the dressing room or other private settings without
consent and to refrain from sharing “sensitive information,” which is
defined as information about injuries, game strategies, recruiting
plans, or academic matters.249 This type of tailoring illustrates that it
is eminently possible to curb only speech disruptive to team functions
without entirely forbidding unfiltered interaction with the news
media.
Higher-education institutions presumably would have to concede
that they have no authority to prevent rank-and-file students from
speaking freely with the news media. Any attempt to enact a campus-
wide prohibition against unapproved communications with journalists
would be so far beyond the authority of a public university as to flunk
even the most deferential judicial scrutiny. Any claim of authority
over athletes’ speech, then, must necessarily flow from the “quasi-em-
ployment” relationship, as athletic departments insist that athletes
“represent” their institutions in a way more akin to employee status
than student status.
If that is the case, the employment setting provides some guidance
as to what would and would not be a permissible interviewing con-
straint. In an instructive public-employment case, Hanneman v.
Breier, the Seventh Circuit held that a police department regulation
forbidding officers from sharing confidential internal matters with the
public was facially constitutional.250 But the court went on to find
that the regulation was misapplied in disciplining three officers who
248. See Umar, supra note 212, at 334 (observing, in context of colleges’ restraints on
social media activity, that “institutions demand that student athletes constantly
present a positive image of the schools and their programs” and that universities
are willing “to censor student athletes to achieve this goal, even by perhaps un-
constitutional methods”).
249. UNIV. OF TEX., TEXAS ATHLETICS STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT AND EXPEC-
TATIONS 4 (2019) (produced in response to FOI request, copy on file with authors).
250. Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976).
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wrote to the mayor complaining about an investigation into their po-
litical activities because the investigation had already become a mat-
ter of public concern before they sent the letter.251 Although the
Hanneman case predates NTEU and was decided under the Pickering
standard, it illustrates that a narrowly tailored prohibition on sharing
confidential information that is not a matter of public concern (e.g.,
locker-room gossip about teammates) would probably pass muster in
the athletic setting. That is all the authority that a public university
should legitimately need to maintain orderly operations within its
athletic program, giving student-athletes the “breathing space” that
the First Amendment demands.252
Regardless of whether athletes occupy a legal status akin to “em-
ployee” or to “student,” there is no doctrinal support for categorically
prohibiting unapproved communications with the news media. If ath-
letic departments insist on enforcing any type of filtering policy, those
policies must contain strict safeguards to make them constitutionally
sound. First, they must be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling
government interest. For instance, a gatekeeping rule might be defen-
sible if limited to the days on which athletes are taking final exams or
in the hours before a game when athletes are engrossed in prepara-
tions. Second, athletic departments must enforce clear standards
against viewpoint-based gatekeeping (for example, a coach could not
selectively forbid an athlete known to have strong political opinions
from granting an interview about a divisive political issue) and afford
athletes who are denied access to the media an avenue for timely chal-
lenging the denial.
Although it was decided under labor laws that apply only in the
private sector, the NLRB’s disposition of the Northwestern University
football case provides a roadmap for what a constitutionally permissi-
ble athletic department policy might look like in the public sector.253
In its 2016 Advice Memorandum, the NLRB legal counsel’s office iden-
tified a number of restrictions that would constitute unfair labor prac-
tices in the private sector, including telling players that “[a]ll media
request[s] for interviews with student athletes must be made through
athletic communications” and instructing athletes to say only “posi-
tive” things to the press.254 Northwestern brought itself into compli-
ance with NLRB standards by replacing these restrictions with
statements merely encouraging athletes to observe good interviewing
251. Id. at 754.
252. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“Because First Amendment free-
doms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only
with narrow specificity.” (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311
(1940))).
253. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
254. Advice Memo, supra note 197, at 5.
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practices, offering the “option” of asking the communications office for
help, and affirmatively reassuring athletes: “As responsible student
athletes, you may directly speak with members of the media if you
choose to do so.”255 This guidance makes sense in the public sector, as
well. There is no reason athletes at institutions governed by the First
Amendment should have weaker free-speech protections than those
competing at private institutions.
Colleges legitimately may enforce reasonable “time, place, and
manner” restrictions, such as restricting interviews during times that
would distract from athletes’ academic obligations or game prepara-
tions. But a wholesale ban on unapproved interaction with the news
media is unlikely to prove constitutionally permissible if challenged,
doubly so without standards to ensure that interviews are not rejected
because of the views the athletes intend to express.
255. Id.
